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CAN DATA BREACH CLAIMS SURVIVE THE
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE?
Catherine M. Sharkey*
I. INTRODUCTION
In our highly interconnected, Internet-driven age, data security
breaches pose a formidable regulatory challenge.1  An age-old debate
regarding the appropriate mix of standards (ex ante regulation versus
ex post litigation), enforcement mechanisms (public agencies versus
decentralized private enforcement), and federalism components (na-
tional versus state-by-state regulatory efforts) is playing out in real
time with a cacophonous mix of emerging federal and state legisla-
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1. Data security breaches impose significant costs.  Recent studies report average firm costs
per data breach incident in the range of one to eight million dollars. See, e.g., Roberta D. An-
derson, Viruses, Trojans and Spyware, Oh My! The Yellow Brick Road to Coverage in the Land
of Internet Oz, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 529, 542 (2014) (“The Ponemon Institute’s 2012
Cyber Crime Study found that ‘the average annualized cost of cyber crime for 56 organizations in
[its] study is $8.9 million per year, with a range of $1.4 million to $46 million.’ This number is up
from the $8.4 million average annualized cost reflected in the 2011 survey.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (footnotes omitted) (quoting PONEMON INST., 2012 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: UNITED
STATES 1 (2012), https://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2012_US_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_
Study_FINAL6%20.pdf)); id. at 541 (“The 2011 high-profile attack on the Sony PlayStation Net-
work alone was estimated to cost some $170 million.”); Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber
Risks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Evolving Exposure, Today’s Litigation, and Tomorrow’s
Challenges, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 369, 372 (2015) (“The average cost of a malicious data
breach in the United States [from 2012 to 2013 was] . . . $7,155,402.”); see also Pa. State Emps.
Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317, 322 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“‘[T]o mitigate the
damage caused by the compromise of PSECU members’ Visa card magnetic stripe information,
PSECU canceled’ the 20,029 Visa cards . . . ‘to protect its legal rights and to fulfill a contractual
obligation owed to its customers.’  The cancellation and reissuance cost PSECU $98,128.13.”
(citations omitted) (quoting Amended Complaint ¶¶ 39, 65, Pa. State Emps. Credit Union, 398 F.
Supp. 2d at 317 (No. CV-04-1554), 2005 WL 4341834)).
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tion,2 agency enforcement actions,3 state law enforcement,4 and pri-
vate class action litigation.
2. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012) (imposing an affirmative obligation on financial institutions to
protect the security and confidentiality of customers’ nonpublic personal information); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d (2012) (setting requirements and standards for health care providers’ management of
individually identifiable health information); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2016) (implementing 42
U.S.C. § 1320d); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–164.414 (2016) (providing for notification in the event of a
breach of protected health information).
Forty-seven of the fifty states have notification statutes that require prompt notice of data
breaches to those affected and to the attorney general. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.171 (2016)
(requiring notice for security breaches of personal information); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 3
(Supp. 2016); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2016); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney Supp.
2016).  Three states—Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington—take statutory protection a step fur-
ther. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 325E.64 (2016) (prohibiting the retention of personal credit or
debit card information and imposing liability on the breaching party to the card issuer in the
event of violation and damages); NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.215 (2015) (requiring any data collec-
tor doing business in the state to comply with the current version of the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS)); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.020 (2016) (governing the lia-
bility of credit card vendors and processors in the event of a breach).  These statutory provisions
are discussed further infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. R
3. E.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 799
F.3d 236, 259 (3d Cir. 2015); see Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 636–37 (2014); Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Cord Blood Bank Settles FTC Charges that It Failed to Protect Consumers Sensitive
Personal Information (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/
cord-blood-bank-settles-ftc-charges-it-failed-protect-consumers; Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, CVS Caremark Settles FTC Charges: Failed to Protect Medical and Financial Privacy
of Customers and Employees; CVS Pharmacy Also Pays $2.25 Million to Settle Allegations of
HIPAA Violations (Feb. 18, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/02/cvs-
caremark-settles-ftc-chargesfailed-protect-medical-financial; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Dave & Buster’s Settles FTC Charges It Failed to Protect Consumers’ Information (Mar. 25,
2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/03/dave-busters-settles-ftc-charges-it-
failed-protect-consumers; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Set-
tling Charges Against Cbr Systems, Inc. (May 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/05/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-cbr-systems-inc; Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges that Security Flaws in RockYou Game Site Exposed 32 Mil-
lion Email Addresses and Passwords (Mar. 27, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/2012/03/ftc-charges-security-flaws-rockyou-game-site-exposed-32-million; Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settles Charges Against Two Companies that Allegedly Failed to Pro-
tect Sensitive Employee Data (May 3, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2011/05/ftc-settles-charges-against-two-companies-allegedly-failed; Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Marketer of Internet-Connected Home Security Video Cameras Settles FTC Charges
It Failed to Protect Consumers’ Privacy (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/09/marketer-internet-connected-home-security-video-cameras-settles.
4. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 747, 752–54 (2016).  Sometimes the state legislature makes express data breach
enforcement choices.  California, for example, creates a private right of action. See CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.93 (2014) (requiring disclosure of security breaches by agencies that
maintain data and establishing and creating a private action to recover actual damages resulting
from identity theft).  Illinois, by contrast, gives enforcement power exclusively to the attorney
general under state consumer protection law. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/40 (Supp. 2016).
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This Article focuses on the emerging credit card data breach class
action litigation and one formidable obstacle such litigation has en-
countered: the economic loss rule.5  In its broadest terms, the eco-
nomic loss rule posits that, absent physical injury or damage to
property, there can be no tort recovery for negligent conduct that
causes purely financial losses.6  Merchants and intermediary credit
card processors have raised the economic loss rule as a bar to recovery
against claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation brought
by two classes of plaintiffs: (1) individual consumers whose credit card
information has been stolen, and (2) banks and other financial institu-
5. Another frequent roadblock—not considered here—is lack of an injury in fact.  Federal
courts have repeatedly determined that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring suit.  The
future potential injury that may result from someone obtaining personal information when no
fraudulent charges have been made has been deemed too speculative to qualify as an injury in
fact. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations of hypo-
thetical, future injury are insufficient to establish standing [in a data breach case].”); Green v.
eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 WL 2066531, at *5 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (“[T]he potential threat
of identity theft or identity fraud, to the extent any exists in this case, does not confer stand-
ing.”); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653–60 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (find-
ing no injury-in-fact in data breach suit for increased risk of harm, loss of privacy, and loss of
value of plaintiff’s personally identifiable information); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No.
12-cv-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (“Merely alleging an increased risk
of identity theft or fraud is insufficient to establish standing.”). But see Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s
China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding future injuries such as increased risk
of fraudulent charges and identity theft due to stolen data are “concrete enough to support a
lawsuit”); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding
that the alleged future risk was substantial enough to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of
standing); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that “a credi-
ble threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing [plain-
tiffs’] unencrypted personal data” was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact).
In the face of restrictive rulings on standing, plaintiffs have sought recovery for credit monitor-
ing—a present, realized cost—drawing an explicit parallel to medical monitoring actions. See,
e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 970
(S.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that, as with medical monitoring, recovery of credit monitoring costs in
data breach cases “requires a plaintiff to plead both a logical and temporal connection between
the decision to purchase credit monitoring services and the defendant’s alleged breach,” which is
a “high burden”); Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (expressing doubt
that data breach cases and medical monitoring cases are analogous).
6. Economic-Loss Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see Dan B. Dobbs, An
Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 713 (2006) (“The
stand-alone or ‘pure’ economic loss covered by the economic loss rule refers to pecuniary or
commercial loss that does not arise from actionable physical, emotion or reputational injury to
persons or physical injury to property.”); see also Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure Eco-
nomic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 823 (2009) (“For well over a century, it has been a settled
feature of American and English tort law that in a variety of situations there is no recovery in
negligence for pure economic loss, that is, for economic loss unrelated to injury to the person or
the property of the plaintiff.”).
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tions who have suffered financial losses due to reimbursements for
fraudulent charges or reissuing cards.7
Scholars have argued that the economic loss rule—a “venerable
chestnut of tort law”8—sharply limits or altogether precludes poten-
tial tort liability for cybersecurity lapses.  In turn, the rule hampers
tort law’s salience as a way to force actors to internalize the costs of
the external harms they cause.9  What is thus far missing from the de-
bate, however, is a more fine-tuned account of the workings of the
economic loss rule in this doctrinal context.  This Article tackles this
challenge and a more varied picture emerges.  Namely, the extent to
which the economic loss rule serves as a formidable barrier to credit
card data security breach cases depends upon the underlying state law;
in particular, whether a state adopts the majority or minority position
on the rule, as well as how it defines various exceptions thereto.  The
doctrinal landscape unearthed here is consistent with recent empirical
findings in data breach litigation that report a settlement rate that is
appreciably higher than what is implied in the legal literature to date
touting essentially no liability risk.10
7. See, e.g., Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421, 423 (5th
Cir. 2013); In re Home Depot, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-md-2583-TWT,
2016 WL 2897520 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2016).  In addition to claims of negligence and negligent
misrepresentation, plaintiffs often allege statutory violations of consumer protection statutes and
data breach notification statutes; negligence per se based on the violation of state or federal
unfair or deceptive trade acts; breach of implied contract and/or contract; as well as unjust en-
richment. See generally Catherine Palo, Liability of Businesses to Governments and Consumers
for Breach of Data Security for Consumers’ Information, 152 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 209
(2016).
8. Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1535 (2013).
9. See Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An Application to
Cyberspace, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007) (arguing that where transaction costs are high—as
Hylton argues they are apt to be in cyberspace—a negligence (liability) rule is the best way to
control externalities); Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identify Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 275 (2005) (imposing negligence liability “will force the database
possessor, who benefits from the use of computerized information, to internalize losses relating
to improperly accessed data as a cost of doing business”); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Reser-
voirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80
S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 283–86 (2007) (arguing for a strict liability approach to data breaches,
relying on a Calabresian cheapest cost avoider rationale, among others).
10. See Sasha Romanosky et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 102 (2014).  The authors report an overall settlement rate of known fed-
eral data breach lawsuits of 52% (86/164), which is “much higher than legal privacy scholarship
would suggest.” Id. at 93.  Prior scholarship had suggested effectively no liability risk at all, and
would thus predict no settlement.  By contrast, the authors demonstrate that there is a real (al-
beit relatively small) risk of liability and that filed cases settle at the theoretically normal rate.
More specifically, they report a 3.7% filing rate for data breaches, which could be interpreted as
a lower bound, given that they exclude state courts and, with respect to federal courts, they rely
exclusively on hand collected cases.  The authors likewise point out that their empirical findings
“could also be useful to insurance markets as a means of assessing a firm’s risk.” Id. at 102.
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This Article’s findings have significant implications for the emerging
cybersecurity insurance field, especially in terms of assessing firms’
overall liability exposure, and suggest that firms (at least those facing
tort liability in certain jurisdictions that either do not employ the eco-
nomic loss rule, or have weak versions in place) should pay more at-
tention to the third-party liability portions of such policies.11
Moreover, this Article raises the question whether, as a more robust
third-party liability insurance market emerges in response to a greater
threat of tort liability, insurers will engage in further risk manage-
ment, exerting more potent regulatory control.12
The authors do not make any comments on the geographical distribution of their data, which
consists exclusively of federal data breach lawsuits.  It would be interesting to investigate
whether the different state legal regimes have any impact on the number or types of breaches in
particular states; and whether there are any behavioral response implications, in terms of either
firms’ taking additional data security precautions or adapting their corporate activity in any
fashion.
11. Cyberinsurance policies typically cover both first- and third-party losses arising from a
cyber incident. See Podolak, supra note 1, at 374–75.  But, to date, the first-party component has R
attracted more attention. See NAT’L PROTECTION & PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., CYBERSECURITY INSURANCE WORKSHOP READOUT REPORT 1 (2012) [herein-
after 2012 WORKING GROUP], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cybersecurity-
insurance-read-out-report.pdf  (“Cybersecurity insurance is designed to mitigate losses from a
variety of cyber incidents, including data breaches, network damage, and cyber extortion.”); see
also Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Liability Insurance: How Insurance
Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Business, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 14 n.52) (on file with DePaul Law Review) (“Whereas most companies did
not have cyber insurance a decade ago, one in three organizations now have insurance specifi-
cally protecting against cyber and data theft losses.”).  Talesh’s evidence suggests that, at present,
firms are very interested in the first-party liability components of cybersecurity insurance poli-
cies. See id. at 16–17 (presenting evidence—based on interviews, participant observation at
cyber liability insurance conferences, and analysis of insurer loss prevention manuals and risk
management services—that firms seek various services offered by insurance companies, namely
forensic experts, public relations firms, credit monitoring/restoration and legal services, primarily
to deal with regulatory compliance issues).
“Third-party policies, by contrast, cover losses that a company causes to its customers and
others, such as harms arising from the exposure of personally identifiable information (PII)
through a data breach.” NAT’L PROTECTION & PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., INSURANCE INDUSTRY WORKING SESSION READOUT REPORT: INSURANCE
FOR CYBER-RELATED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE LOSS: KEY ISSUES 1 n.1 (2014) [hereinafter
2014 WORKING GROUP], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/July%202014%20In
surance%20Industry%20Working%20Session_1.pdf.  There is evidence, moreover, that the mar-
ket for third-party liability insurance is growing. See 2012 WORKING GROUP, supra, at 1, 9 (not-
ing that the market for first-party cyberinsurance policies, which are “expensive, rare, and
largely unattractive,” is lagging behind the third-party market).
12. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L.
REV. 409, 437–38 (2005) (describing the risk management function of insurance).  The role of
insurance as risk management various significantly by insurance line, market conditions and the
like. See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 267–310 (2003); Tom
Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional
Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1416–23 (2013) (developing a conceptual framework for insur-
ance as governance across different liability areas based upon risk-based pricing, underwriting,
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Data security breach cases are fertile ground to explore the impact
of the economic loss rule and to challenge the conceptual underpin-
nings of this judge-made doctrine.  At present, there is a great deal of
confusion on the part of courts as to whether and how the economic
loss rule should apply.  The second main goal of this Article is to pro-
vide both a conceptual framework for courts’ resolution of data
breach cases and a sound normative justification.  Upon closer exami-
nation, it becomes clear that the rule operates in a fundamentally dis-
tinct manner in the “stranger paradigm” as compared to the
“contracting parties paradigm.”  In the stranger paradigm—when an
actor’s negligence causes financial losses to a party with whom the
actor has no pre-existing relationship—courts have deployed the eco-
nomic loss rule to stave off the ripple effect or floodgates of unlimited
liability.13  Courts’ overriding concern is that, should they impose tort
liability for purely financial losses—which unlike physical harms tend
to cascade forward in an unforeseeable (and uncontrollable) manner,
impacting business and financial relationships down an endless
chain—defendants will face potentially unlimited and disproportion-
ate liability for their negligent actions.14  Thus, the economic loss rule
draws the line for negligence liability (i.e., the parameters of the duty
of reasonable care) at physical injuries and property damage.15
In fairly sharp contrast, the overriding question for courts con-
fronting the “contracting parties paradigm” is not whether a duty is
owed, but what is the nature of that duty.  Specifically, the question is
whether a duty should be imposed by law, regardless of, or over and
above, any voluntary allocation of risks and responsibilities already
contract design, claims management, loss prevention services, research and education, and en-
gagement with public regulators).
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Protection and Programs Director-
ate assists private and public sector partners’ efforts to secure cyber networks.  In recent years,
DHS has held workshops to examine “the ability of insurance carriers to offer relevant coverage
at reasonable prices in return for the adoption of cyber risk management . . . procedures.”  2014
WORKING GROUP, supra note 11, at 1.  Nonetheless, these efforts are hampered by the fact that R
“no commonly agreed-to cybersecurity risk management standards, best practices, or metrics
exist—a state of affairs that hinders the ability of carriers to conduct risk comparisons across
companies.”  2012 WORKING GROUP, supra note 11, at 4; see also 2014 WORKING GROUP, supra R
note 11, at 4 (noting that cyber risk actual tables, which are essential for providing insurance, are R
largely undeveloped).
13. Courts have articulated this concern alternately in terms of no proximate cause and no
duty rulings as a matter of law.
14. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 6, at 715 (“Stand-alone economic loss often spreads without R
limit.”).
15. Note that this barrier does not pertain to intentional torts, such as fraud and intentional
interference with contract.  Here, presumably the intent prong serves to delimit liability, and
there is no corresponding fear of over-deterrence.
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made between the contracting parties.  In other words, it is here that
the economic loss rule functions primarily as a form of “border con-
trol,” policing the boundaries of tort and contract.16
What makes the credit card data security breach cases so vexing is
that they often straddle the stranger/contracting parties paradigms.
They comprise a distinct form of “third party cases”—where the vic-
tims and defendants are not themselves in a contractual relationship,
but nonetheless, they typically contract with a common entity, and
thus are tied together through a complex web of contracts.17  One fed-
eral district court described this web as follows:
Issuer banks . . . issue credit cards to consumers.  Acquirer banks . . .
process payments for the merchants who make credit-card sales.
When a consumer makes a credit-card purchase, the merchant
swipes the card, sending a message to the acquirer bank.  The ac-
quirer bank then contacts the issuer bank to determine whether suf-
ficient credit exists in the account.  If so, the issuer bank clears the
transaction, relays the message to the acquirer bank, which notifies
the merchant.  On a daily basis, the issuer bank forwards payment
to the acquirer bank, which deposits the payment into the
merchant’s account.18
Typically, plaintiff issuer banks and defendant merchants and acquir-
ing banks are members of the credit card networks (e.g., Visa and
MasterCard), and thus are subject to the networks’ regulations and
16. See William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1229 (1994) (“[I]n border
wars between contract law and tort law, contract law itself should tell us which body of law
should control.  If contract law purports to decide the case, the negligence paradigm . . . should
stay in the background.”); see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Eco-
nomic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 546 (2009) (“If there is a convincing rationale
for the economic loss rule, it is that the rule performs a critical boundary-line function, separat-
ing the law of torts from the law of contracts.”).
17. Third-party cases are common in the sphere of negligent misrepresentation, the canonical
example being that of a negligent accountant who furnishes an erroneous audit to a client, which
is then relied upon by some third-party making a loan to that entity. See Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 443–48 (N.Y. 1931); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW
INST. 1976).  The third-party prototypical negligence action involves so-called three-cornered
construction disputes, whereby a construction project manager contracts separately with an ar-
chitect and construction company (who have no contract between them) and the negligence of
the architect causes significant delay and increased costs to the construction company, who then
sues the architect for negligence. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECO-
NOMIC HARM § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2014); see, e.g., United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132,
133–37 (1918); L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 234 P.3d 490, 492–94 (Cal. 2010);
BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 67–68 (Colo. 2004); Ass’n of Apartment Owners
of Newtown Meadows ex rel. Bd. of Dirs. v. Venture 15, Inc., 167 P.3d 225, 232–37 (Haw. 2007);
Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 725
(Ind. 2010); Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Va.
1988).
18. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. H-10-171, 2011
WL 1232352, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011).
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contractual remedies.19  Privity thus exists between the issuer bank
and the payment card network, as well as between the acquirer bank
and the payment card network.  Privity does not exist between the
issuer bank and the acquirer bank or credit card processor; nor does it
always exist between consumer credit card holders and merchants.
Such third-party cases could be slotted into the stranger paradigm—
on the theory that the victims (issuer banks or consumers) and de-
fendants (merchants, acquirer banks, or credit card processing enti-
ties) are not in direct contractual privity.  Alternatively, the cases
could be treated as part and parcel of the consensual contracting par-
ties paradigm on account of the web of contracts that link together
victims and defendants.  Courts have done both, though unpredict-
ably.  This Article aims to explore which makes more sense from a
regulatory standpoint.
Part I explores the stranger paradigm, with its attendant focus on
preventing unlimited liability.  The majority rule finds no negligence
liability for purely financial losses (the per se economic loss rule), with
some jurisdictions recognizing carve-out exceptions for some form of
“independent tort duty” or “special relationship” (the qualified eco-
nomic loss rule).  The minority rule rejects these formulations of the
economic loss rule (per se and qualified), instead positing liability for
negligently inflicted economic losses, conditional on particular fore-
seeability.  Thus, the extent to which the stranger economic loss rule
serves as a formidable barrier to credit card data security breach cases
will depend upon the underlying state law: whether or not the state
adopts the majority economic loss rule, and how it defines any excep-
tions thereto.
Part II turns to the contracting parties paradigm and its considera-
tion of concurrent remedies in tort and contract and accompanying
principles of deference to contract.  The American Law Institute’s
(ALI) Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm has
set forth a more narrowly tailored economic loss rule for parties in
19. Id. (noting that Visa and MasterCard Card Operating Regulations, which apply between
merchants, issuer banks, and acquirer banks, specify procedures for issuer banks to make claims
in the event of data breaches); see, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. v. Int’l Bus.
Machines Corp., 533 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The CISP [Cardholder Information Security
Program] provisions apply to Issuers and Acquirers and include broad security requirements
intended to protect Cardholder Information.”); Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club
Inc., 918 N.E.2d 36, 42 (Mass. 2009) (“Visa and MasterCard each issue extensive operating regu-
lations that govern the payment processing system and their members’ obligations.  Every finan-
cial institution that becomes a member of Visa and MasterCard organizations must sign a
contract that includes a provision that it will comply with these regulations; acquirers are also
contractually obligated to ensure that their merchants comply.”).
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contractual privity: no liability for negligence in the negotiation or
performance of a contractual duty.20  There is, however, a significant
exception for “professionals,” who remain liable to their clients in tort
as well as contract.21  Several courts have viewed the credit card data
security breach cases through the lens of the contracting parties para-
digm, including considering the extent to which credit card processors
might be considered professionals.
Having explored these two dichotomous paradigms and courts’ res-
olution of third-party data security breach cases under each frame-
work, Part III demonstrates how choice of paradigm can be outcome-
determinative; for instance, the economic loss rule is less likely to ap-
ply under the stranger paradigm, but would bar tort liability under the
contracting parties paradigm.  One federal district court succinctly
summed up the confounding nature of the particular type of third-
party/web of contracts scenario encountered here:
[T]he credit card industry involves a complex web of relationships
involving numerous players governed by both individual contracts
and exhaustive regulations promulgated by Visa and other card net-
works. These relationships may well create non-contractual duties
between various participants in the system . . . . In addition, this web
of relationships may or may not render . . . negligence claim[s] sus-
ceptible to the economic loss doctrine.22
Part III thus tries to pave a new road forward.  Jurisdictions should
not eschew entirely the contracting parties paradigm.  In other words,
it does not make sense to apply the stranger economic loss rule (even
with exceptions) across the board regardless of the existence of con-
tract (or contracting opportunities).  Neither will it suffice, however,
for jurisdictions to blithely adopt and follow the Restatement (Third)
of Torts approach of a contractual privity economic loss rule coupled
with a categorical “professionals” exception.  Tort law, by forcing the
internalization of externalities, plays a critical role in deterring exces-
sively risky conduct and encouraging risk management strategies by
actors and their insurers.  The credit card data breach cases can be
reframed in a coherent way that defers to contractual allocation of
risk and responsibility but nonetheless allows tort liability to be
deployed when needed to ensure the internalization of third-party
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2012).
21. Id. § 4 (“A professional is subject to liability in tort for economic loss caused by the negli-
gent performance of an undertaking to serve a client.”).
22. Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (D. Me. 2005).
The court held that issues of fact as to the nature of the relationships existed and denied a
motion to dismiss. Id.  Since Maine had not yet expanded the economic loss doctrine beyond
products cases, the court was hesitant to extend its reach. Id.
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costs.  Seen from a broader regulatory perspective—especially taking
into account state statutory provisions relating to enforcement of pri-
vate industry standards in the credit card arena—the economic loss
rule functions as a boundary-policing doctrine between tort and regu-
lation as alternative mechanisms to regulate private parties.
II. THE STRANGER PARADIGM
Tort law’s classic domain is the “stranger paradigm”—injuries in-
flicted on victims with whom the actor has no pre-existing contractual
or special relationship.  Indeed, whereas contract law deals with en-
forcing bargains between consenting parties, tort law allocates risks
and responsibilities among strangers in society, all of whom have du-
ties imposed by law to act with reasonable care towards others to
avoid inflicting injuries.  At its core, tort law protects physical injuries
and damage to property.  It does so by imposing a general duty on
actors to take reasonable care to avoid physical injuries to persons and
property; however, tort law traditionally imposes far more limited du-
ties to avoid causing purely financial losses.
Courts’ (as opposed to scholars’) main concern in the realm of pure
financial loss centers on foreseeability and the prospect of unlimited
liability.23  In the classic words of a Pennsylvania court,
[N]egligent harm to economic advantage alone is too remote for
recovery under a negligence theory.  The reason a plaintiff cannot
recover stems from the fact that the negligent actor has no knowl-
edge of the contract or prospective relation and thus has no reason
to foresee any harm to the plaintiff’s interest.24
Moreover, the court reasoned:
To allow a cause of action for negligent cause of purely economic
loss would be to open the door to every person in the economic
chain of the negligent person or business to bring a cause of action.
Such an outstanding burden is clearly inappropriate and a danger to
our economic system.25
The “stranger economic loss rule” posits that, as between parties
with no contractual or special relationship, there is no duty to avoid
negligent infliction of purely financial losses.26  The majority posi-
23. For a critique of scholars’ philosophical and economic justifications of the stranger eco-
nomic loss rule, see Catherine M. Sharkey, In Search of the Cheapest Cost Avoider: Another
View of the Economic Loss Rule, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
24. Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
25. Id.
26. See Dobbs, supra note 6, at 715 (“The first of the economic loss rules (the stranger rule) R
. . . is that, subject to some qualifications, a defendant owes no duty to exercise reasonable care
for the pure stand-alone economic interests of strangers–that is to persons with whom the defen-
dant has no relationship by contract, undertaking, or specific legal obligation.”).
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tion—illustrated by the New York Court of Appeals canonical 2001
decision in 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia
Center, Inc.27—embraces the stranger economic loss rule, subject to a
number of exceptions, including independent duty or special relation-
ship and negligent misrepresentation.28  The minority position—em-
braced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its similarly canonical,
1985 decision People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail
Corp.29—rejects a per se stranger economic loss rule, and instead cab-
ins liability for purely financial losses with a particular foreseeability
constraint.30
The first lesson to emerge from data security breach cases is that the
extent to which the stranger economic loss rule will bar recovery is
highly dependent on the governing state law, which varies considera-
bly across the United States.
A. Majority Rule of 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet
The 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet scenario is as follows: a construc-
tion project is handled negligently; a building under construction col-
lapses, and several surrounding blocks in a highly concentrated,
commercial shopping district have to be closed.31  A neighboring deli
sues the building owner for financial losses stemming from the loss of
business during the several weeks of restricted entry to the area.32
The New York Court of Appeals held that negligence claims assert-
ing purely economic losses are foreclosed, absent some sort of special
relationship that would warrant imposing on the defendant a duty to
act with reasonable care towards those with whom he is not in a direct
relationship.33  Under the 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet conception of
the economic loss rule, courts focus on whether a direct relationship
exists between the tortfeasor and the victim.34  By embracing the
stranger economic loss rule, courts seek to prevent boundless liability
“to an indeterminate class of persons conceivably injured by any neg-
ligence in a defendant’s act.”35
27.  750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001).
28. Id. at 1099–1100.
29. 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
30. Id. at 114–16.
31. 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet, 750 N.E.2d at 1099–1100.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1101 (“Landowners, for example, have a duty to protect tenants, patrons and invi-
tees from foreseeable harm caused by the criminal conduct of others while they are on the prem-
ises, because the special relationship puts them in the best position to protect against the risk.”).
34. Id. (“Absent a duty running directly to the injured person there can be no liability in
damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm.”).
35. Id.
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We turn now to courts’ application of the majority stranger eco-
nomic loss rule to data security breach cases.
1. No Negligence Liability for Purely Financial Losses
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts have embraced fairly robust per se
economic loss rules,36 and data security breach claims decided under
those states’ underlying common law have not fared well.
Pennsylvania refuses to “recognize a cause of action to compensate
a party suffering purely economic loss, absent any direct physical in-
jury or property damage as a result of the negligence of another
party.”37  In fashioning the economic loss rule, courts have drawn
from the Robins Dry Dock38 principle (which also animates the no-
recovery rule in 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet) of avoiding indetermi-
nate liability to an indeterminate class.39  To echo the words quoted
above from the Pennsylvania Superior Court:
To allow a cause of action for negligent cause of purely economic
loss would be to open the door to every person in the economic
chain of the negligent person or business to bring a cause of action.
Such an outstanding burden is clearly inappropriate and a danger to
our economic system.40
In the context of credit card data security breaches, courts have sug-
gested that the notion of foreseeability as a limitation is stretched be-
yond limit when the class is defined as those whose information the
bank has on file.41
Consider Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.,42 the Penn-
sylvania class action lawsuit stemming from a data security breach at
BJ’s Wholesale Club.  The issuer bank sued the merchant and argued
that the foreseeability of the loss of sensitive information due to lax
36. See In re Michaels Store Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 531 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding,
under Illinois law, that “the economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiff’s tort claim because the
plaintiff has not suffered personal injury or property damage” and citing Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania law favorably).
37. Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277, 278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); see also
Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 183, 204 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“Aik-
ens’s economic loss doctrine has been followed in subsequent cases to bar negligence claims
seeking recovery for ‘economic damages’ or ‘losses’ unless there has also been physical injury
either to a person or property.”).
38.  Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
39. Id. at 308–09; see 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 711
N.Y.S.2d 391, 393–94 (App. Div. 2000) (referencing Robins Dry Dock).
40. Aikens, 501 A.2d at 279.
41. See Pa. State Emps. Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317, 336 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
42. 395 F. Supp. 2d 183 (M.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d in relevant part, 533 F.3d 162, 175–78 (3d Cir.
2008).
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data security measures should overcome the economic loss rule.43
The federal district court, applying Pennsylvania law, disagreed, not-
ing the resolute quality of Pennsylvania’s economic loss rule, barring
“negligence claims seeking recovery for economic damages or losses
unless there has also been physical injury either to a person or prop-
erty.”44  Moreover, the court reinforced the underlying unlimited lia-
bility rationale for the rule: “[A]s a matter of public policy . . . there
would be no right of recovery in negligence for economic losses to
prevent anyone ‘in the economic chain’ to sue so that the ‘economic
system’ would not be burdened.”45  The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, rejecting the issuer bank’s attempt “to get around the
fatal limitation of the economic loss doctrine.”46
Massachusetts embraces a similarly broad, per se economic loss
rule: “[P]urely economic losses are unrecoverable in tort and strict lia-
bility actions in the absence of personal injury or property damage.”47
Courts applying Massachusetts law likewise readily dispense with data
breach claims.  A paradigmatic example arose in In re TJX Cos. Retail
Security Breach Litigation,48 in which hackers broke into the proprie-
tary systems of TJX Companies, a group of apparel and home
merchants, gaining access to the personal and financial information of
over forty-five million customer accounts.49  Plaintiffs, including issu-
ing banks responsible for distributing debit and credit cards to their
customers, sued TJX and Fifth Third Bank (the payment card proces-
sor) to recover financial losses stemming from their negligence in fail-
43. Sovereign Bank (issuer bank) issued Visa cards to cardholders who used the cards at BJ’s.
In turn, “BJ’s retained the cardholders’ information after Sovereign had approved the transac-
tions, contrary to the operating regulations. Thereafter, third parties [hackers] obtained the card-
holder information to make unauthorized purchases.” Id. at 189–90, 204 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 204.  Sovereign had claimed reimbursement for the fraudulent transactions as well as
expenses for issuing new cards, the loss of fees and commissions while the cards were being
replaced, and loss of good will. Id. at 189–90.
45. Id. at 204 (quoting Aikens, 501 A.2d at 279).
46. Pa. State Emps. Credit Union, 533 F.3d at 176 (rejecting the issuer bank’s “attempt[ ] to
pirouette around the economic loss doctrine by arguing that it only applies when the plaintiff has
suffered an unforeseeable loss”).
47. Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 770 N.E.2d 447, 454 (Mass. 2002) (quoting FMR Corp. v. Bos.
Edison Co., 613 N.E. 2d 902, 903 (Mass. 1993)); see also Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale
Club Inc., 918 N.E.2d 36, 46 (Mass. 2009) (“[T]he economic loss doctrine bars recovery unless
the plaintiffs can establish that the injuries they suffered due to the defendants’ negligence in-
volved physical harm or property damage, and not solely economic loss.”).
48. 524 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass. 2007).
49. Id. at 85–86.
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ing to secure the cardholder data.50  The federal district court rejected
the claim, relying on Massachusetts’ per se economic loss rule.51
Affirming the district court’s decision, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that “[l]ike ‘duty’ and ‘proximate cause,’ the doctrine
cabins what could otherwise be open-ended negligence liability to an-
yone affected by a negligent act.”52  This general concern for poten-
tially unlimited liability permeates courts’ articulation of the stranger
economic loss rule, whereby, absent physical injury to persons or
property, courts insist upon some independent or special relationship
before allowing recovery for negligently inflicted economic losses.53
The premise of the per se economic loss rule—recovery for negli-
gently inflicted physical injuries and property damage, but excluding
purely financial losses—rests on a fundamental distinction between
physical injury and property damage on the one hand, and financial
losses on the other.  Courts take it as a given that such a distinction is
justified;54 it is, however, difficult to sustain such a dividing line—par-
ticularly separating property damage from financial losses—on philo-
50. Id. at 86–87.
51. Id. at 90 (citing Aldrich, 770 N.E.2d at 454).  Having relied upon the per se Massachusetts
rule, the court then suggested a narrower application (in light of the web of contractual relation-
ships) that “a commercial user can protect himself by seeking express contractual assurances
concerning the product (and thereby perhaps paying more for the product) or by obtaining in-
surance against losses.” Id. (quoting Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350, 1354–55 (Mass. 1989)).  The court thus suggested that, in light of
the web of contractual relationships, the “victims” may be the cheapest cost avoiders here; more-
over, the no recovery holding might encourage victims to protect themselves via contract or else
insurance.  For further discussion of this rationale, see infra Part V.
52. In re TJX Cos., 564 F.3d at 498.
53. 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y.
2001); accord In re Chi. Flood Litig., 680 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ill. 1997) (applying the economic loss
rule to victims of flood alleging purely economic losses to “avoid[ ] the consequences of open-
ended tort liability”); D & D Transp., Ltd. v. Interline Energy Servs., Inc., 117 P.3d 423, 428
(Wyo. 2005) (applying the economic loss rule to claims of party not in privity with defendant,
noting policy of “seek[ing] to avoid the consequence of open-ended tort liability”); see also Ul-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (“If liability for negligence exists, a
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose [defendants] to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class.”).
54. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made a rare attempt to justify the distinction as
follows:
The bright line rule of damage to a proprietary interest, a[t] most, has the virtue of
predictability with the vice of creating results in cases at its edge that are said to be
“unjust” or “unfair.” . . .  [W]hen lines are drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional
edges to be reasonable and predictable, such differing results are the inevitable result—
indeed, decisions are the desired product. . . .  [I]n addition, by making results more
predictable, [the rule] serves a normative function. It operates as a rule of law and
allows a court to adjudicate rather than manage.
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985).
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sophical or economic theories of tort law.55  The data security breach
cases push the limits of the property/financial loss divide, as plaintiff
issuing banks have endeavored to withstand dismissal pursuant to the
economic loss rule by arguing that the loss of use of payment cards, as
a result of a breach, qualifies as physical harm to property.56
To date, these claims have been roundly rejected.  Courts have been
unwilling to equate financial loss or consequential expenditure of
money to physical property damage.  The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, affirming Sovereign Bank, feared setting a dangerous precedent
that “would totally eviscerate the economic loss doctrine because any
economic loss would morph into the required loss of property and
thereby furnish the damages required for a negligence claim.”57  In
Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank,58 a
case factually identical to Sovereign Bank, the federal district court
confronted the property damage argument by requiring a “plaintiff
[to] show physical damage to property, not its tangible nature, to
avoid the application of the economic loss doctrine.”59  Likewise, in In
re TJX Cos., noting that “data can have value and the value can be
lost,” the First Circuit Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that
the loss of value must have been “a result of physical destruction of
property” in order for a negligence claim to survive.60  These courts’
rejections stem more from a perceived need to preserve the economic
loss rule, rather than grappling at a deeper level with whether the
property/economic loss distinction should persist in our modern infor-
mation-age society.
55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. R
56. See, e.g., Pa. State Emps. Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. Supp. 2d 317, 329–30
(M.D. Pa. 2005) (detailing plaintiffs’ allegations that “the cards are tangible property and that
the loss of the use of these cards, ‘physical tangible items—constitutes property damage that
obviates the economic loss doctrine’”) (quoting Plaintiff PSECU’s Brief in Opposition to BJ’S
Wholesale Club’s Motion to Dismiss at 20, Pa. State Emps. Credit Union, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 317
(No. CV-04-1554), 2005 WL 4341838); Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 395 F. Supp.
2d 183, 204 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (reciting plaintiffs’ allegations that they suffered “a loss of ‘real and
concrete’ property, [their] money”); In re TJX Cos., 524 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (“The issuing banks
fall back on the argument that the economic loss doctrine does not, in any event, bar their
negligence claim because they have incurred damage to property in that the compromised cards
could no longer be used and that loss [sic] card verification codes were lost.”); Cumis Ins. Soc’y,
Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club Inc., 918 N.E.2d 36, 41 (Mass. 2009) (repeating plaintiffs’ allegations
that “millions of credit cards they were required to reissue constituted harm to physical
property”).
57. Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 162.
58. 398 F. Supp. 2d 317.
59. Id. at 330; see also Cumis, 918 N.E.2d at 46 (“[A]s courts in other jurisdictions have ob-
served, the question here is not whether the credit cards are tangible property, but rather the
nature of the damages sought by the plaintiffs.”).
60. In re TJX Cos., 564 F.3d at 489.
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2. Exceptions
A fairly significant number of states eschew the per se formulation
of the economic loss rule and embrace instead a qualified version,
whereby tort recovery for negligently inflicted economic harms is pre-
mised on an independent tort duty or some special relationship be-
tween the parties.  This tort duty is some form of public duty imposed
by law, not derived from contract.61  Courts’ recognition of such an
independent tort duty may require an ad hoc analysis of the relation-
ships between the parties,62 or it may be categorically defined—such
as applying to negligent misrepresentation claims.63  Next we examine
how these exceptions play out in the data breach context.
a. Independent Duty or Special Relationship
The wide array of state law formulations of the economic loss rule is
on display in the multi-jurisdiction, consumer class action In re Target
Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,64 consolidated in the
Minnesota federal district court.  The court confronted the divergent
economic-loss-rule doctrines across eleven different state jurisdic-
61. See, e.g., A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass’n, 114 P.3d 862, 865–66
(Colo. 2005) (holding that a subcontractor in privity with a contractor and a developer owed an
independent duty not to construct a homeowners’ development negligently); Donatelli v. D.R.
Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 312 P.3d 620, 627 (Wash. 2013) (allowing tort claims for purely
economic loss in a construction dispute when the plaintiff can show that the defendant had a
duty existing outside of the terms of the parties’ contract).
62. See, e.g., Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims
Landing, LC, 221 P.3d 234, 244 (Utah 2009) (“‘The question of whether [an independent] duty
exists is a question of law’ and involves the ‘examination of the legal relationships between the
parties, an analysis of the duties created by these relationships,’ and ‘policy judgments applied to
relationships.’” (quoting Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283, 286 (Utah 2006))).
63. See, e.g., Bull v. BGK Holdings, LLC, 859 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243 (D.N.M. 2012) (“Com-
mon law claims of negligent and intentional misrepresentation can be examples of claims which
arise from an independent and recognized duty of care.”); Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH
Constr., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Ky. 2004) (“[W]e agree that the tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation defines an independent duty for which the recovery in tort for economic loss is
available.”).
64. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1171–76 (D. Minn. 2014).  Following the court’s rejection of defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss, the parties settled the claims. See Tamara Burns, $10M Target Data
Breach Settlement Obtains Final Approval, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Nov. 19, 2015), https://topclas-
sactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/237688-target-10m-setfinal-approval/.  On No-
vember 18, 2015, the Minnesota federal district court approved the $10 million class action
settlement. Id.  Approximately 110 million consumers were estimated to have had their personal
information compromised by the 2013 data security breaches. Id.  According to the judge, “In
the Court’s view, the settlement represents a significant victory for a class whose legal claims are
as tenuous as those here.” Id.
Target settled a separate class action lawsuit brought by financial institutions for $39 million.
Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Million Over Data Breach, CNN (Dec. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/news/companies/target-data-breach-settlement/index.html.
Target also settled separately with Visa for $67 million. Id.
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tions.65  The court found that members of the plaintiff consumer class,
who used credit cards at a Target retail location, were not in privity
with Target.  The court thus employed the stranger paradigm.66
The court determined that Alaska, California, Illinois, Iowa, and
Massachusetts all barred negligence claims arising from pure financial
loss—basically deploying the per se stranger economic loss rule.67  But
other jurisdictions applied a qualified version of the rule, recognizing
various exceptions to the stranger paradigm, and here, the court
looked to see if the relationship weighed in favor of tort liability even
in the absence of personal injury or property damage.68 The court sug-
gested that the near-privity, direct relationship between plaintiffs and
Target created a duty.  Therefore, claims made in states that recognize
such an exception could not be dismissed.69  New York, for example,
allowed the independent duty exception for a privity-like relationship
between Target and customers with respect to personal financial infor-
mation.70  New Hampshire, the District of Columbia, and Idaho also
allowed exceptions for various kinds of special relationships.71
b. Negligent Misrepresentation
A corollary to the independent duty exception is the negligent mis-
representation tort, a claim that can be stated where a retailer has
represented that its customers’ credit card information will be pro-
tected.  Some states recognize the tort as creating a type of indepen-
dent duty, especially in the professional services context,72 while
65. In re Target Corp., 66. F. Supp. 3d at 1171–76.
66. Id. at 1171–72.  The district court opinion evinces confusion on this front.  Despite begin-
ning with the view that the economic loss rule governs the boundary between tort and contract—
describing the Uniform Commercial Code as the appropriate remedy for economic loss from
diminished commercial expectations—the court nonetheless analyzes the situation as one in
which there is no contractual privity between Target and the consumer class. Id.  Indeed, al-
though deploying the stranger paradigm, the court nonetheless cites third-party or web of con-
tracts cases for support. Id.  Moreover, the defendant chose not to argue that the economic loss
rule should apply in eight states because those states bar negligence claims only between con-
tracting parties. Id.
67. Id. at 1172–74.
68. Id. at 1172.
69. Id. at 1175 (analyzing New York law).
70. Id.  The court stated that plaintiffs allege Target had “a quasi-contractual, privity-like rela-
tionship with respect to their personal financial information.” Id.  The court relied on a New
York case that takes a stranger approach, beginning with question of duty, and finding that
because of the relationship between the parties there was a duty to protect plaintiffs from eco-
nomic losses. See In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 428, 460–61
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
71. In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–75.
72. See, e.g., Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC v. Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1163 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“Colorado tort law, whatever else it may or may not require by way of accuracy in describing
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others recognize the tort as a stand-alone exception to the economic
loss rule.73
Data breach plaintiffs have invoked negligent misrepresentation
claims to avoid the economic loss rule with varying degrees of success.
Not surprisingly, jurisdictions such as Pennsylvania, which have em-
braced a robust per se economic loss rule, have narrowly construed
the negligent misrepresentation carve-out.
In Sovereign Bank, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (applying
Pennsylvania law) rejected plaintiffs’ move to shoehorn liability into
the negligent misrepresentation mold, which the court described nar-
rowly as a “doctrine to allow a commercial plaintiff recourse from an
‘expert supplier of information’ with whom the plaintiff has no con-
tractual relationship, when the plaintiff has relied on that person’s
‘special expertise’ and the ‘supplier negligently misrepresents the in-
formation to another in privity.’”74  As the court recognized, many
other courts recognize claims of third-party negligent misrepresenta-
tion in situations when the very nature of the work engaged in by
commercial goods, clearly imposes a duty of reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (AM.
LAW INST. 1976)); Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng’rs, Inc., 312 P.3d 620, 625 (Wash.
2013) (en banc) (“[T]he duty to avoid misrepresentations that induce a party to enter into a
contract arises independently of the contract.”).
73. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC Donahue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ill. 1997)
(recognizing an exception to Illinois’ economic loss rule “where the plaintiff’s damages are prox-
imately caused by a negligent misrepresentation by a defendant in the business of supplying
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions”) (citing Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (Ill. 1982)); Van Sickle Const. Co. v. Wachovia Commer-
cial Mortg., Inc. 783 N.W.2d 684, 691–92 (Iowa 2010) (stating that in Iowa, “negligent misrepre-
sentation has always been understood as an economic tort allowing for the recovery of purely
economic losses”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 5
(AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1976) (recog-
nizing liability for pecuniary loss in cases of negligent misrepresentation).
74. Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 177 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 286 (Pa. 2005)).  Plaintiffs re-
lied heavily on a case involving a general construction contractor that relied in its winning bid on
design specifications provided by the defendant architecture firm and sued the firm when they
discovered that the construction would require “special construction means, methods and design
tables [not provided for in the design], resulting in substantially increased construction costs.”
Bilt-Rite Contractors, 886 A.2d at 272.  The court in Bilt-Rite had to determine whether a negli-
gent misrepresentation action could be maintained against the architecture firm where there was
no privity between the parties, but there was foreseeable reliance on the information supplied by
the architect. Id.  The court, adopting § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, concluded that
such an action could be maintained. Id. at 272–73.  In part, it was persuaded that § 552 “re-
flect[s] modern business realities” and “merely recognizes that it is reasonable to hold [design]
professionals to a traditional duty of care for foreseeable harm.” Id. at 286.  As such, it permit-
ted the negligent misrepresentation action to overcome the economic loss rule because it was
foreseeable that Bilt-Rite would be harmed through its justifiable reliance on the architecture
firm’s negligently supplied information. Id. at 288.
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professionals—including architects, lawyers, and accountants—poten-
tially creates a duty to others that operates regardless of the existence
of privity of contract.  The court concluded that while it may be rea-
sonable to argue that Sovereign Bank relied on BJ’s representation to
protect its customers’ sensitive information, BJ’s did not hold itself
out either as a professional or an “expert supplier of information”
such that it would be liable for the breach of some independent duty
owed to Sovereign Bank.75
In a recent data breach action addressing traditional third-party
negligent misrepresentation claims asserted in an effort to evade
Pennsylvania’s economic loss rule, a Pennsylvania federal district
court likewise barred the claim.76  The court elaborated on data
breach cases as appropriate contexts for the economic loss rule:
[I]n this era, where the threat of data breaches by unknown third
parties is omnipresent, regardless of what preventative measures are
taken, the potential disparity between the degree of a defendant’s
fault and the damages to be recovered could be immensely dispro-
portionate, resulting in drastic implications for defendants named in
lawsuits as well as our economic system at large.77
Thus, although Pennsylvania does recognize the tort of negligent mis-
representation in certain contexts, it does not in the context of a data
security breach.
Nevada, however, has recognized negligent misrepresentation
claims in the data breach context.  In In re Zappos.com,78 a lawsuit
arose after a 2012 data breach of Zappos.com, an online shoe and
clothing retailer.79  Hackers gained access to Zappos customer servers
containing personal information of about twenty-four million Zappos
customers.80
The court, recognizing that Nevada’s economic loss rule would bar
the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, treated the negligence claims as negli-
gent misrepresentation claims.81  Nevada recognizes negligent misrep-
75. Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 177–78.
76. See Longenecker-Wells v. BeneCard Servs., Inc., No. 15-CV-00422, 2015 WL 5576753, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2015), aff’d, 658 F. App’x 659 (3d Cir. 2016).
77. Id. at *6.
78. In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 12-cv-00325-RCJ-VPC,
2013 WL 4830497 (D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013).
79. Id. at *1–4.
80. David Goldman, Zappos Hacked, 24 Million Accounts Accessed, CNN (Jan. 16, 2012,
11:33 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/16/technology/zappos_hack/.
81. The court noted that the interaction between customers and the website resulted in a
contract for the sale of goods that was not alleged to have been breached by the data loss. In re
Zappos.com, 2013 WL 4830497, at *3.  However, the website also set forth “unilateral statements
of fact as to the safety of customers’ data” which could be the basis of a negligent misrepresenta-
tion tort claim if made negligently. Id.  Thus, the court asked not whether the data security was
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resentation as an exception to the economic loss rule because without
such liability “the law would not exert significant financial pressures
to avoid such negligence,” including “negligent misstatements about
financial matters.”82  As a means to effectuate that policy, the Zappos
court noted that if plaintiffs have an opportunity to incorporate “a
particular standard of performance” into a contract, then the duties
the parties owe to each other are dictated by the contractual agree-
ment.83  In this case, however, the court found no evidence that the
agreements between the parties constituted a contractual scheme that
would “exert significant financial pressure” on Zappos to avoid mak-
ing misrepresentations to its customers.84  Consequently, the court
concluded that the economic loss doctrine did not preclude claims of
negligent misrepresentation in this case and permitted the plaintiffs to
amend their claims.85
B. Minority Rule of People Express
The stranger economic loss rule (with varying degrees of qualifica-
tions for recognizing independent tort duties) has gained a foothold in
jurisdictions across the United States.  But the New Jersey Supreme
Court—long a “leader in expanding tort liability”86—resisted the rule
in People Express.87  In that case, an airline sued the defendant rail
yard owner for business interruption losses after a volatile chemical
caught fire in the defendant’s rail yard, located adjacent to Newark
negligent, but rather whether the promise that the data would be protected was negligent. See
id.
82. Id. at *4 (quoting Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 302 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Nev.
2013)).
83. Id. (quoting Halcrow, 302 P.3d at 1153).
84. Id. (quoting Halcrow, 302 P.3d at 1153).  The court thus suggested that negligent misrepre-
sentation is an exception to the economic loss rule only where there are not detailed and negoti-
ated contracts.  In other words, it is an exception to the stranger economic loss rule, but would
not necessarily apply under the contracting parties paradigm.
85. Id. at *4 & n.2 (allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint given that “negligently
misstat[ing] the safety of Plaintiff’s financial information” was not precluded by Nevada’s eco-
nomic loss rule).
86. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. H-10-171, 2011
WL 1232352, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (quoting Hakimoglu v. Trump, 70 F.3d 291, 295 (3d
Cir. 1995)).
87. People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985).  The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm embraces the stranger economic loss
rule, as elaborated in 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet and Robins v. Dry Dock. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECON. HARM § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2014).  The Reporter’s
Note seeks to marginalize the People Express minority position. Id. at cmt. a (“Contrary posi-
tions have been taken only occasionally in the case law.” (citing People Express and Mattingly v.
Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987))).
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Airport.88  Due to the chemical spill and risk of fire, an evacuation of
a one-mile radius was ordered.89  The airport terminal, located within
the one-mile radius, was shut down for twelve hours, forcing the air-
line to cancel flights and preventing its employees from booking
flights.90
The New Jersey Supreme Court roundly rejected the economic loss
rule, reasoning that the traditional reasons for prohibiting recovery
for economic losses (i.e., fears of unlimited liability and fraudulent
claims) did not justify a per se bar on recovery.91  The court proposed
a rule that would recognize a limited duty owed to “particular plain-
tiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable class with respect to whom
defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer such dam-
ages from its conduct.”92  In other words, the duty to prevent financial
losses hinged on the foreseeability of damages.  Nonetheless, the court
conceded that “the courts will be required to draw upon notions of
fairness, common sense and morality to fix the line limiting liability as
a matter of public policy, rather than an uncritical application of the
principle of particular foreseeability.”93  The court concluded that the
business interruption losses suffered by the airline were, or should
have been, foreseeable to the defendant.94  Specifically, the court rea-
soned that, given the close proximity of the terminal and the airline to
the freight yard, the obvious nature of plaintiff’s operations, and par-
ticular foreseeability of economic losses resulting from an accident
and evacuation—coupled with the defendants’ knowledge of the vola-
tile properties of the chemicals and the existence of an emergency re-
sponse plan calling for an evacuation—the plaintiff’s economic losses,
including lost profits, should be recoverable.95
The People Express rule was front and center in the credit card data
breach at issue in Lone Star National Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Pay-
88. People Express, 495 A.2d at 108.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 109–12.
92. Id. at 116.  In 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet, the New York Court of Appeals simultaneously
distinguished and rejected the People Express ruling.  532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v.
Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101, 1103 (N.Y. 2001).  The court described a special
relationship as giving rise to a duty to protect the plaintiff against the risk of harm because it
“puts [defendant] in the best position to protect against the risk.” Id.  This is distinct from the
People Express “particular foreseeability” standard because it does not apply to the general
public. Id. at 1102.  As the New York Court of Appeals explained: “[W]herever the line is
drawn, invariably it cuts off liability to persons who foreseeably might be plaintiffs.” Id. at 1103.
93. People Express, 495 A.2d at 116.
94. Id. at 118.
95. Id.
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ment Systems.96  In 2009, Heartland Payment Systems, an electronic
payment processor, discovered that it had been hacked and millions of
credit card numbers within its database had been compromised.97  Is-
suer banks asserted that Heartland was negligent in failing to comply
with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards, a set of reg-
ulations and guidelines developed by payment card networks such as
Visa and MasterCard “to encourage and enhance cardholder data se-
curity and facilitate the broad adoption of consistent data security
measures globally.”98  The issuer banks asserted purely economic
losses in the form of fraudulent charges and the cost of reissuing new
credit cards.99  In a consolidated multi-district litigation, a Texas fed-
eral district court held that the economic loss rule barred the claims.100
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “under
New Jersey law, the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort recovery
where the defendant causes an identifiable class of plaintiffs to which
it owes a duty of care to suffer economic loss that does not result in
boundless liability.”101  The court did not have difficulty finding that
the issuer banks constituted an “identifiable class.”102  As the court
explained, “Heartland had reason to foresee the Issuer Banks would
be the entities to suffer economic losses were Heartland negligent.
The identities, nature, and number of the victims are easily foresee-
able, as the Issuer Banks are the very entities to which Heartland
sends payment card information.”103  Nor, the court reasoned, would
Heartland be “exposed to ‘boundless liability,’ but rather to the rea-
sonable amount of loss from a limited number of entities.”104  Moreo-
ver, “in the absence of a tort remedy, the Issuer Banks would be left
with no remedy for Heartland’s alleged negligence, defying ‘notions of
fairness, common sense and morality.’”105
96. 729 F.3d 421, 424–26 (5th Cir. 2013).
97. See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d
566, 573 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d in part, Lone Star Nat’l Bank v. Heartland Payment Sys., 729
F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013).
98. Id. at 575; see PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA
SECURITY STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 5 (2016),
https://pcicompliance.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/pci_dss_v3-2.pdf.
99. In re Heartland Payment Sys., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 588–89.
100. Id. at 590.  For discussion of the district court’s decision, see infra notes 138–48 and ac- R
companying text.  I have deferred discussion because the district court framed the case within
the contracting parties paradigm—not the stranger paradigm.
101. Lone Star, 729 F.3d at 424 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 426.
103. Id. (citation omitted) (citing People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495
A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985)).
104. Id. (citing People Express, 495 A.2d at 116).
105. Id. (quoting People Express, 495 A.2d at 116).
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III. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES PARADIGM
Moving from the stranger paradigm to the contracting parties para-
digm involves a significant analytical shift.  No longer is the overriding
concern the threat of unlimited or disproportionate liability; indeed,
the nature of privity de facto limits the parties whose interests might
be impacted.  The paramount issue facing courts is whether to recog-
nize concurrent remedies in tort and contract; stated differently, in
what circumstances should there be a tort duty imposed by law, not-
withstanding the voluntary contractual arrangements to which the
parties have agreed.  On the whole, courts that apply the contracting
parties paradigm tend to favor resolution of the conflict under the
terms of parties’ existing contractual obligations, resisting recognition
of negligence claims asserting purely economic loss.
The ALI’s Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic
Harm has articulated a contractual privity economic loss rule, barring
tort recovery for negligently inflicted economic harms arising between
contracting parties.106  The Restatement (Third) of Torts (and all juris-
dictions that have adopted such a rule) nonetheless carves out an ex-
ception for certain “professionals,” who remain subject to concurrent
liability in tort and contract.107
Several courts have applied the contracting parties paradigm (as op-
posed to the stranger paradigm) to credit card data security breach
cases.  Recall that the prototypical credit card data breach claim arises
between an issuing bank (those that issue credit and debit cards to
customers) and the breaching organization (usually a merchant or
payment card processor).  Both plaintiffs and defendants have a con-
tractual relationship with a third-party payment card network such as
Visa or MasterCard.  To place these cases within the contracting par-
ties paradigm, courts characterize this chain of privity as creating a
complex regime of (typically) sophisticated parties that militates def-
erence to contract, especially because Visa and MasterCard regula-
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2012).  The Restatement (Third) of Torts extends the contractual economic loss rule to claims of
negligent misrepresentation as well. Id. § 5(5) (recommending no liability for negligent misrep-
resentations “made in the course of negotiating or performing a contract between the parties”).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 imposed no similar restriction and would seemingly allow
for claims of negligent misrepresentation even among contracting parties. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 4; see id. § 4
cmt. b (“Lawyers, doctors, and accountants are invariably regarded by courts as professionals;
insurance agents and architects are examples of additional parties this Restatement would so
recognize, whereas construction contractors and tradesmen are on the other side of the line.”).
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tions provide for redress in the event of a data breach affecting
members of the network.108
A. No Negligence Liability Between Contracting Parties
The contractual privity economic loss rule holds generally that there
can be no recovery for purely economic losses when parties have had
the opportunity to allocate risk according to the terms of their con-
tractual relationship.109  In principle, this means that when a contrac-
tual remedy is apparent between the parties, courts will invoke the
economic loss rule as a means to channel claims for purely economic
losses away from tort and toward contract law.
Occasionally, though privity between the parties may not be appar-
ent, courts may nonetheless find that the parties operate in a complex
web of relationships that create a privity-like situation.110  Thus,
though the parties may appear to be strangers, their presence in an
108. See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F.
Supp. 2d 566, 588 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (“By participating in the Visa and MasterCard networks, the
Financial Institution Plaintiffs entered into the web of contractual relationships that included not
only issuer and acquirer banks but also third-party businesses, such as [Defendant] Heartland,
that process transactions for network members.”), rev’d in part, Lone Star Nat’l Bank v. Heart-
land Payment Sys., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale
Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (D. Me. 2005) (“[T]he credit card industry involves a com-
plex web of relationships involving numerous players governed by both individual contracts and
exhaustive regulations promulgated by Visa and other card networks. These relationships may
well create non-contractual duties between various participants in the system . . . [and] may or
may not render Plaintiff’s negligence claim susceptible to the economic loss doctrine.”).
109. This version of the economic loss rule originated in the products liability context and
then courts extended it outward to cover services as well as products and then to additional
consensual exchanges. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Remains of the Citadel (Economic Loss
Rule in Products Cases), 100 MINN. L. REV. 1845 (2016) (discussing the rule’s origins in products
liability); see, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986)
(“When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for
leaving the party to its contractual remedies are strong.”); Ass’n of Apartment Owners of New-
town Meadows ex rel. Bd. of Dirs. v. Venture 15, Inc., 167 P.3d 225, 279 (Haw. 2007); Indianapo-
lis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ind. 2010)
(“[T]he economic loss rule reflects that the resolution of liability for purely economic loss caused
by negligence is more appropriately determined by commercial rather than tort law.”); Giddings
& Lewis, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 348 S.W.3d 729, 738 (Ky. 2011) (noting that the economic
loss rule “recognizes that economic losses, in essence, deprive the purchaser of the benefit of his
bargain and that such losses are best addressed by the parties’ contract and relevant provisions
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code”); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (“If tort and contract remedies were
allowed to overlap, certainty and predictability in allocating risk would decrease and impede
future business activity.”); Excel Const., Inc. v. HKM Eng’g, Inc., 228 P.3d 40, 45 (Wyo. 2010)
(“The economic loss rule is founded on the theory that parties to a contract may allocate their
risks by agreement and do not need the special protections of tort law to recover for damages
caused by a breach of the contract.”) (citations omitted).
110. See, e.g., Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go, L.C., 801 N.W.2d 499, 505 (Iowa 2011).
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“inter-connected web of relationships within the market”111 may draw
the parties into a consensual framework.  Accordingly, courts look to
apply a version of the rule that is grounded in the reasons and justifi-
cations for deference to contract: to encourage allocation of risk
through contract and to guard against remedying disappointed com-
mercial expectations in tort.112
Such a rationale has been applied to several data breach cases,
where courts have recognized that payment card issuers, merchants,
acquirer banks, and processors all operate in a complex payment card
ecosystem.  A prime example is Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go,
L.C.113  Annett and Kum & Go were not in direct privity, but their
relationship existed through a web of contracts connecting them with
a common third party, the credit card issuer Comdata.114  A trucking
company’s employee used a card issued by the company (a subsidiary
of Annett) to make unauthorized purchases at a gas station (Kum &
Go).115  The credit card network, Comdata, had rules covering risk
allocation for fraud charges similar to Visa and MasterCard, whereby
the issuing bank and trucking company were required to bear the
losses.116  The trucking company sued the gas station, which was not in
privity with the trucking company, but contracted with the company’s
credit card network.
The court held that these relationships constituted enough of a con-
tract-like arrangement to preclude tort-based liability: “When two
parties have a contractual relationship, the economic loss rule pre-
vents one party from bringing a negligence action against the other
over the first party’s defeated expectations—a subject matter the par-
ties can be presumed to have allocated between themselves in their
contract.”117  The court applied this approach to the web of contracts,
noting that “the doctrine is by no means limited to the situation where
the plaintiff and the defendant are in direct contractual privity.”118
The court reasoned:
111. In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1191 (D. Kan. 2015).
112. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 749, 764–65 (2006) (noting that liability has been precluded when the “[plaintiff]
could have obtained redress for the harm from the actor by contract with the actor or through a
chain of contracts reaching back to the actor”).
113. 801 N.W.2d 499.
114. Id. at 501.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 502.
117. Id. at 503.
118. Id. at 504.  The court invoked “the stranger economic loss rule” to make this point. Id.
And it then analyzed the case through the stranger paradigm lens, highlighting the unlimited
liability rationale: Lacking direct privity, economic loss must still be contained because “‘[i]n a
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When parties enter into a chain of contracts, even if the two parties
at issue have not actually entered into an agreement with each
other, courts have applied the “contractual economic loss rule” to
bar tort claims for economic loss, on the theory that tort law should
not supplant a consensual network of contracts.119
Applied to the case before it, the court reasoned that each party could
allocate the risk ex ante through the web of contracts and, as such, “it
is difficult to see why a tort remedy is needed here.”120  Moreover,
according to the court, the trucking company “contracted to assume
certain risks of financial loss and had the ability to minimize these
risks.”121
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court likewise stood firm
against the encroachment of tort into contract in Cumis Insurance So-
ciety, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.,122 a case involving the same
data breach of BJ’s Wholesale Club discussed above, whereby hackers
gained access to over nine million credit card numbers stored by the
merchant.123  The plaintiff credit unions that issued the compromised
credit cards suffered financial losses from cancelling and reissuing
credit cards to their affected customers.  They brought claims against
BJ’s and Fifth Third (the credit card processor) for negligence and
negligent misrepresentation.124  Applying Massachusetts’ per se eco-
nomic loss rule, the court readily dispatched the negligence claim.125
complex society such as ours, economic reverberations travel quickly and widely, resulting in
potentially limitless liability.’” Id.  The court characterized Annett’s claim thusly: “It is a remote
economic loss claim . . . but with the additional twist that this case does not even involve an
initial personal injury or damage to property.” Id.  The court then turned to analyzing the case
under the contracting parties paradigm—and it is this alternative framework that I highlight in
the text above.
Note, however, that the dissent applies the stranger paradigm exclusively—and reaches the
opposite conclusion. See id. at 508, 511 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“Allowing the claim against
Kum & Go to proceed will not result in a flood of litigation, speculative damages, or thwart any
of the other rationales commonly asserted in association with the economic loss rule.”).  Here is
an example of the confusion that arises when the stranger paradigm, based on unlimited liability
concerns, is applied instead of the contracting parties paradigm, which focuses on delineating the
border between tort and contract claims.  For further discussion, see infra Sections IV.B–C.
119. Annett Holdings, 801 N.W.2d at 504.
120. Id. at 505.
121. Id. (“Annett had the capacity to prevent fraudulent or unauthorized use by its employee:
Its subsidiary TMC received a daily report of [its employee’s] transactions, and as soon as a new
fuel manager took over, that person noticed the suspicious activity immediately.”).  Here, the
court seemed to embrace a cheapest cost avoider rationale—to which I will return.
122. 918 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. 2009).
123. Id. at 39.
124. Id. at 40.  The plaintiffs also brought claims for breach of contract as third-party benefi-
ciaries, fraud, and various violations of consumer protection statutes. Id.
125. Id. at 46–47 (affirming the lower court’s determination that “the plaintiffs suffered only
economic harm due to the theft of the credit card account information, and therefore that the
economic loss doctrine barred recovery on their negligence claims”).
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In further rejecting the misrepresentation claim, the court held that
“failure to perform a contractual duty [here, to comply with regula-
tions regarding data storage] does not give rise to a tort claim for neg-
ligent misrepresentation.”126  The court clearly viewed the tort claims
as an effort to circumvent the web of contracts, and the court was
resolute in maintaining that “[p]laintiffs who are unable to prevail on
their contract claims may not repackage the same claims under tort
law.”127
B. Professionals/Special Relationship Exception
The contracting-parties economic loss rule recognizes an exception
for professionals128 and possibly other special relationships between
the parties arising independent of contract.129  Some jurisdictions may
even recognize a professional services situation as creating a special
relationship between the parties.130  Underlying these exceptions is
the idea that, although parties to a contract are expected to allocate
risk amongst themselves, there are external duties (separate and apart
from contractual ones) that may occasionally be imposed on profes-
sionals, expert dealers in certain types of information, among others.
In data breach cases between contracting parties (or parties operat-
ing amidst a web of contractual relations), plaintiffs have attempted to
126. Id. at 49.  The court called attention to the governing Visa and MasterCard operating
regulations that required the defendant retailer and acquiring bank to take steps to protect card-
holder information. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929
N.E.2d 722, 736 (Ind. 2010) (“Indiana courts should recognize that the rule is a general rule and
be open to appropriate exceptions, such as . . . lawyer malpractice.”); Annett Holdings, Inc. v.
Kum & Go, L.C., 801 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Iowa 2011) (“[P]urely economic losses are recoverable in
actions asserting claims of professional negligence against attorneys and accountants.”) (citing
Van Sickle Constr. Co. v. Wachovia Commercial Mortg., 783 N.W.2d 684, 692 n.5 (Iowa 2010));
Plourde Sand & Gravel Co. v. JGI E., Inc., 917 A.2d 1250, 1255 (N.H. 2007) (noting that New
Hampshire has applied a special relationship exception to attorneys and insurance investigators);
Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 89
(S.C. 1995) (“[W]e have long held lawyers and accountants liable in tort for malpractice. . . .
These professionals, however, owe a duty to the client and sometimes to third parties which
arises separate and distinct from the contract for services.”); LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr.
Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 243–44 (Tex. 2014) (“Professional malpractice cases are an exception [to
Texas’ economic loss] rule.  A client can recover purely economic losses from a negligent lawyer,
regardless of whether the lawyer and client have a contract.”).
129. See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 635
S.E.2d 38, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (“There is an exception to [the economic loss rule] if ‘special
circumstances’ exist, such as where a ‘special relationship between the parties’ supporting the
imposition of an independent duty of care regardless of the parties’ contractual relationship.”).
130. See EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 928 A.2d 497, 507 (Vt. 2007) (“Purely economic losses
may be recoverable in professional services cases because the parties have a special relationship,
which creates a duty of care independent of contract obligations.”).
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push the boundaries of the “professionals” or “special relationship”
exception.  A Pennsylvania federal court resisted such efforts in En-
slin v. Coca-Cola Co.131 when it refused to recognize an extra-contrac-
tual special relationship between an employer and employee. Enslin
dealt with the theft of fifty-five laptops containing the personal infor-
mation of over 74,000 Coca-Cola employees.132  Following the breach,
plaintiffs sued Coca-Cola for negligence leading to fraudulent charges,
resulting in account closures and identity theft.133
Because the parties were subject to an “arms-length business con-
tract,” the court applied the economic loss rule in order to maintain a
boundary between contract and tort.134  The court reasoned that “tort
law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a re-
sult of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.”135  Nor was the
court persuaded that any “special relationship” exception applied.
According to the court, to meet the high threshold for this exception,
“courts must ask ‘whether the relationship goes beyond mere reliance
on superior skill, and into a relationship characterized by overmaster-
ing influence on one side or weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably
reposed on the other side.’”136  The court concluded that there was no
significant imbalance of power between the parties that would justify
the recognition of any such special relationship.
IV. ECONOMIC LOSS RULE FOR DATA BREACH RECONSIDERED
Third-party cases—of which the data breach cases are a prime ex-
ample—do not fit squarely within either the stranger or the con-
tracting parties paradigms, and yet the choice of paradigm may be
outcome determinative, even more so than whether the jurisdiction
adopts the majority (532 Madison Ave. Gourmet) or minority (People
Express) position on the stranger economic loss rule.  Moreover,
courts exhibit a kind of paradigm confusion in this area, often apply-
ing the stranger paradigm to situations for which it is ill-suited.
In the face of this paradigm confusion—or at a minimum lack of
consensus—this Article takes up the challenge to consider a deeper
131. 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
132. Id. at 659.
133. Id. at 660.
134. Id. at 673 (quoting Valley Forge Convention & Visitors v. Visitor’s Servs., Inc., 28 F.
Supp. 2d 947, 953 (E.D. Pa. 1998)) (“If parties to routine arms-length commercial contracts for
the provision of needed goods or services were held to have a ‘special relationship,’ virtually
every breach of such a contract would support a tort claim.”).
135. Id. at 656.
136. Id. at 672–73 (quoting My Space Preschool & Nursery, Inc. v. Capitol Indem. Corp., No.
14-2826, 2015 WL 1185959, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2015)).
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conceptual or theoretical way to think about the role for tort liability
in data breach cases.  This Article insists that the contracting parties
paradigm remains relevant; however, it resists mechanical application
of the contractual privity economic loss rule.  Rather, against the
backdrop of the contracting parties paradigm, it contends that courts
should inquire whether tort liability is nonetheless justified, as a result
of spillovers or externalities onto third parties.  In so doing, courts will
appropriately be in search of the cheapest cost avoider for imposition
of liability.  In the course of that search, the existence of contract as
the chosen method of allocation of risk and responsibility between the
parties should be a significant factor, but one that could be out-
weighed in contexts where such arrangements externalize significant
risk onto hapless third parties.
A. Choice of Paradigm Matters
The Lone Star case presents the choice of paradigm in stark relief.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the “stranger paradigm,”
resting its holding on New Jersey’s People Express rejection of the
stranger economic loss rule, and thus held that the tort claims should
proceed.137  In sharp contrast, the Texas federal district court below, in
In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach
Litigation,138 framed the case within the “contracting parties para-
digm,” leading the court to reject the financial institution plaintiffs’
claims, finding they were better resolved according to the network of
contracts that governed the payment card industry.139  Significantly,
137. Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir.
2013).  For discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 96–105. R
138. No. H-10-171, 2011 WL 1232352 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011).
139. Id. at *21–25.  Defendants in subsequent data breach cases have relied on In re Heartland
to justify dismissal on the basis of a contractual privity economic loss rule. See, e.g., Defendants’
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Stay Discovery at 13–14, In re Target Corp.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-2522 (PAM/JJK), 2014 WL 10520602 (D. Minn. July 3,
2014) (“MasterCard and Visa have published detailed regulations that are designed to deter-
mine through contract how costs will be allocated amongst issuing banks such as the Financial
Institution Plaintiffs and (through their acquiring banks) merchants such as Target in the event
of a payment card breach.”); see also Appellee Silverpop Sys., Inc.’s Brief at 34 n.93, Silverpop
Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mktg. Techs., No. 14-10899-FF, 2014 WL 2557621 (11th Cir. May 27, 2014);
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Consol. Class Action Complaint at n.18, In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer
Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 11-MD-02258, 2013 WL 664723 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013); Defendant
Global Payment Inc.’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Wil-
lingham v. Global Payments Inc., No. 12-cv-01157-RWS-JFK, 2012 WL 12077131, at *19 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 22, 2012); Defendant Heartland Payment Sys., Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support
of its Motion to Dismiss, Fielder v. Penn Station, Inc., No. 12-CV-02166-CAB, 2012 WL 6148764,
at n.2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2012).  Defendants have also cited In re Heartland to support dismis-
sal of the issuing banks’ implied contract claims. See, e.g., Defendant SAIC’s Memorandum in
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the district court reasoned that “it is inappropriate to create tort du-
ties between sophisticated businesses that allocate risks through con-
tract.”140  More specifically, the court explained the “web of
contractual relations” entered by plaintiff “included not only issuer
and acquirer banks but also third-party businesses, such as Heartland,
that process transactions for network members.”141  The acquirer
bank contracted with Heartland Payment Systems, a payment card
processor and target of the hack, “to process Visa and MasterCard
credit-card transactions sent to them by participating merchants.”142
The contractual terms between the acquirer banks and Heartland Pay-
ment Systems incorporated the regulations set forth by Visa and Mas-
terCard (by mandate of Visa and MasterCard).143  These industry
security standards are known as Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards (PCI-DSS).144
Support of Its Motion to Dismiss the Consol. Amended Complaint, In re Sci. Applications Int’l
Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., No. 12-mc-347 (RLW), 2012 WL 7008506, at *54
n.35 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2012) (noting that the plaintiffs in the case alleged “at most an indirect
relationship with Heartland through Heartland’s processing of transactions made with payment
cards that they issued” (quoting In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566, 582–83 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d in part, Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v.
Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 2013))).
140. In re Heartland, 2011 WL 1232352, at *23.  The district court did conclude that, under
People Express, the issuer bank plaintiffs were particularly foreseeable. Id. (“The financial insti-
tutions participating are identifiable, and the kinds of damages alleged—stemming primarily
from card replacement and charging of fraudulent transactions—are straightforward.  The com-
plaint also suggests that the defendants should have been aware of the possibility of a
‘hacker.’”).  But, according to the court, “[m]eeting the foreseeability test under People Express
is necessary but not sufficient under New Jersey law.” Id.  The court then turned to an analysis
of the contractual relationships. Id. at *23–24.
141. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d
566, 588 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
142. In re Heartland, 2011 WL 1232352, at *3.
143. In re Heartland Payment Sys., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (noting that Visa and MasterCard
networks “require the banks they contract with to impose these regulations on the merchants
who submit transactions for processing and on the entities that process the transactions”).
144. See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI DSS Quick Reference Guide: Understanding the
Payment Card Industry Security Standard (June 2016), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/doc-
uments/PCIDSS_QRGv3_2.pdf?agreement=true&time=1486264255400.  The PCI-DSS consists
of twelve basic requirements:
1. Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data.
2. Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security
parameters.
3. Protect stored cardholder data.
4. Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks.
5. Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus software or
programs.
6. Develop and maintain secure systems and applications.
7. Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know.
8. Identify and authenticate access to system components.
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The PCI-DSS played a major role in the court’s reliance on the con-
tracting parties paradigm.  According to the court, because there is a
dispute resolution procedure in place for noncompliance, any entity
subject to network regulations is governed by those regulations, not
tort.  The court was convinced that the parties’ separate relations with
Visa and MasterCard created a viable avenue in contract by which the
issuer banks could seek redress from the acquirer banks and Heart-
land Payment Systems: “The Visa and MasterCard regulations pro-
vide dispute-resolution and compensation rules when data breaches
result in losses to issuers.  The contractual obligations and compensa-
tion system, not tort law, are the Financial Institution Plaintiffs’ only
means of seeking compensation for economic losses.”145  The court
recognized that while Heartland Payment System regularly exchanges
information with issuer banks, they were not contracting parties.146
The court saw no reason to insist on direct contractual privity between
the parties given that there was a chain of privity through which re-
dress could otherwise be sought.147  With respect to the latter, the
court emphasized the nature of the “comprehensive risk-allocation ar-
rangement like the contracts and network requirements in this
case.”148
On appeal in Lone Star, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ques-
tioned the district court’s choice of the contracting parties para-
digm.149  The court was not convinced that the third-party scenario fit
the conventional contracting parties mold.  The court recognized that
issuer and acquirer banks were linked via their mutual membership in
the Visa and MasterCard networks; Heartland, the payment card
processor, did not appear to be a member of those networks (although
still bound by the terms of Visa and MasterCard networks via its con-
9. Restrict physical access to cardholder data.
10. Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data.
11. Regularly test security systems and processes.
12. Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel.
Id. at 9.  For further discussion of the PCI-DSS, see Sutherland Asbill & Brenna LLP, Legal
Alert: PCI DSS – What It Is and Why It Is Relevant to Your Business, Lexology (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=94f604cc-acac-4d26-ac74-b9e329db1067; Robert
J. Pile & Kristin Ward Cleare, Pros and Cons of the Payment Card Data Security Standard,
Law360 (Mar. 1, 2016, 12:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/765601/pros-and-cons-of-the-
payment-card-data-security-standard (“[M]erchants typically are contractually obligated to com-
ply with the PCI DSS.”).
145. In re Heartland, 2011 WL 1232352, at *23–24.
146. Id. at *24.
147. Id.
148. In re Heartland Payment Sys., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
149. Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421, 423 (5th Cir.
2013).
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tract with the acquiring bank), calling into question whether Heart-
land could access the dispute resolution mechanisms offered by Visa
and MasterCard per their membership terms.150  The court’s main
concern was that “[t]his uncertainty in the record leaves open the is-
sue of Issuer Banks’ bargaining power with respect to Heartland’s
participation in the Visa and Mastercard networks.”151  Specifically,
according to the court, “[I]t is not clear that the allocation of risk
‘could have been the subject of . . . negotiations’ between Issuer Banks
and Heartland by way of contracts with Visa and Mastercard.”152  The
court does not even mention the PCI-DSS industry standards, which
were central to the district court’s contrary decision.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals thus deployed the People Ex-
press stranger paradigm, permitting recovery for economic losses
“where the defendant causes an identifiable class of plaintiffs to which
it owes a duty of care to suffer economic loss that does not result in
boundless liability.”153  Under the People Express standard, the issu-
ing bank plaintiffs could be considered “particularly foreseeable”
plaintiffs and “notions of fairness, common sense and morality” de-
manded that Lone Star be able to seek recovery for Heartland’s al-
leged negligence.154
150. Id. at 426 (“[I]t is not clear whether Heartland’s contracts with Acquirer Banks, which
require Heartland to comply with Visa and Mastercard rules and regulations, provide the Issuer
Banks with compensation mechanisms for losses that may be caused by [plaintiffs’]
negligence.”).
151. Id.
152. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dannmann & Co., 594 F.3d
238, 248 (2010)).
153. Id. at 424.
154. Id. (quoting People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J.
1985)).  That said, the court seemed to signal that if, after further development of the record,
contractual remedies surfaced, recovery in tort would be unavailable.  It was simply too early to
dismiss a negligence claim without further development as to the nature of the relationship be-
tween the parties and what remedies would be afforded through these relationships.
Plaintiffs have subsequently relied on Lone Star’s foreseeability analysis to support merchant
liability. See, e.g., Fin. Inst. and Consumer Plaintiffs’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Tar-
get Corp.’s Motion to Stay Discovery at 9, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
No. 14-2522 (PAM/JJK), 2014 WL 10520603 (D. Minn. July 18, 2014) (noting that Lone Star’s
“foreseeability” analysis recognized that Heartland could have foreseen that the issuing bank
plaintiffs would be harmed as a result of Heartland’s negligence). But see Reply Brief for Appel-
lant Citizens Bank of Pa. at 5, Citizens Bank of Pa. v. Reimbursement Techs, Inc., No 14-3320,
2015 WL 636571, at *5 (3d Cir. Feb. 6, 2015) (arguing that the district court’s ruling was in effect
“an argument on the merits that was inappropriate at the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
stage”) (quoting Indep. Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1176 n.9
(3d Cir. 1997)); Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the Consol.
Class Action Complaint at 8, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-2522
(PAM/JJK), 2014 WL 7014856 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 2014) (characterizing Lone Star as merely
holding that “New Jersey’s economic loss doctrine could not be found applicable at the motion
to dismiss stage”).
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The juxtaposition of Heartland and Lone Star provides a powerful
example of the outcome-determinative nature of a court’s choice of
competing paradigms (i.e., stranger versus contracting parties) to ad-
dress data breach claims.  This is not the only such example, although
it is particularly compelling given the different outcomes at trial and
on appeal, with the different outcomes following from different
choices of paradigm applied.
B. Stranger Paradigm Misapplied By Courts
Courts have misapplied the stranger paradigm in lieu of the con-
tracting parties paradigm in a confusing manner.  Moreover, the
courts’ starting place matters.  Namely, courts are often led astray
when they begin with consideration of the “special relationship” be-
tween the parties or an “independent tort duty” that arises between
them, as opposed to considering first the contractual (or quasi-con-
tractual) undertakings between the parties.
The seminal California case, J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory155—which has
wielded influence in California and other jurisdictions—vividly illus-
trates the perils of disregard of the contracting parties paradigm in the
context of the economic loss rule.  In J’Aire, the California Supreme
Court allowed J’Aire Corp., a restaurant owner, to recover purely fi-
nancial losses from Gregory, a general contractor, whose negligence
caused delay in the completion of a construction project at the prem-
ises where J’Aire Corp. leased space.156  The landlord of the premises
had a contract with Gregory for improvements on the premises and
did not specify a date for completion of the work.157  J’Aire Corp.
alleged that the work was not completed within a reasonable time de-
spite having no such guarantee in its lease from the landlord,158 and
that, as a result of the contractor’s delay, it suffered business losses as
a result of not being able to operate due to a lack of heat and air
conditioning.159
Almost oblivious to the web of contractual relations between the
parties, the court articulated what have come to be known as the
“J’Aire factors” for determining whether parties owe one another a
tort duty of care:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the de-
155. 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
156. Id. at 62, 64.
157. Id. at 62.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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gree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness
of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct
and (6) the policy of preventing future harm.160
California courts have applied these J’Aire factors to parties in privity
of contract: “The cases, beginning with J’Aire, are clear and consistent
in permitting recovery even when the economic injury is the only in-
jury alleged; nor is the absence of a contract remedy a requisite.”161
California courts, in other words, apply J’Aire in all scenarios; it is this
refusal to consider separately the stranger versus contracting parties
paradigm that leads to confusion.
In Music Group Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Foote,162 a
case involving contracting parties, a California federal district court
relied on J’Aire, and utilized the stranger paradigm in a confusing
manner.  In that case, a Philippines-based company contracted with
the defendant, the company’s former Chief Technology Officer
(CTO), to provide information technology (IT) services.163  The com-
pany subsequently suffered a cyberattack on its data systems render-
ing them unusable for one month and destroying much of the data
contained within.164  The plaintiff sued the defendant, asserting that in
his role as CTO, he “breached his duty of care to Plaintiff and was
grossly negligent when he failed to perform his obligations under the
defined services of the Agreement.”165
The court noted that California law recognized limited circum-
stances in which a party could maintain a tort action following a
breach of contract.166  The court held that, under the J’Aire factors,167
no special relationship existed between the parties.  The court likewise
dispensed with the argument that the alleged fiduciary duty that the
160. Id. at 63.  Gary Schwartz likewise criticized J’Aire as “ill-advised” in its attempt to define
tort liability comprehensively.  Schwartz argued that the decision posed a risk of overriding limi-
tations on liability and disturbing obligations voluntarily assumed by contract. See Gary T.
Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J’Aire and of Products Lia-
bility, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37, 39–40 (1986).
161. Ott v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 800 (Ct. App. 1995).
162. No. 14-cv-03078-JSC, 2015 WL 3882448 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2015).
163. Id. at *1.
164. Id. at *4.
165. Id. at *15.
166. According to the court, such circumstances include: “(1) when a product defect causes
damage to other property; (2) when a defendant breaches a legal duty independent of the con-
tract and (3) if a ‘special relationship’ existed between the parties.” Id.  Though the court did
not explicitly note that the economic loss doctrine was implicated, it did conclude that only the
latter two exceptions were implicated by the case, thereby implying that plaintiff’s failure to
sufficiently plead either of those exceptions would bar the negligence claim. Id.
167. J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63–64 (Cal. 1979); see supra text accompanying
note 160. R
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defendant owed created an independent duty running to the plain-
tiff.168  The court did, however, find that a genuine issue of  material
fact existed as to whether a CTO provides “professional services” that
create an extra-contractual “professional duty to use such skill, pru-
dence and diligence as other members of the profession commonly
possess and exercise.”169  Though the court could not find any cases
where professional negligence principles had been extended to a CTO
or other IT professional, it nonetheless held that a reasonable jury
could conclude that a CTO, in his professional role, was responsible
for network security.170  The court also noted, “there is enough evi-
dence before the Court from which a reasonable jury could find that
other members of the corporate IT security profession would have
taken certain steps to better protect Music Group from a cyber at-
tack . . . .”171  Accordingly, the court permitted the negligence claim to
proceed on a professional services theory.
The J’Aire approach has led courts to disavow the contracting par-
ties paradigm and has led to anomalous decisions in the data breach
context.  Consider, for example, the California federal district court’s
decision in In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security
Breach Litigation,172 a case involving the theft of user information
stored by Sony in its PlayStation Network and Qriocity services.173  As
part of the user registration process for those services, users were re-
quired to enter certain personal information and agree to both Sony’s
Term of Service and Privacy Policy.174  When Sony’s data systems
were breached, millions of users’ data were stolen.175  After discovery
of the theft, Sony took its network services offline for over a month in
order to audit its systems to discover the source of the breach, thereby
168. See Music Group, 2015 WL 3882448, at *15–16.  The court deployed an interesting vari-
ant of a cheapest cost avoider argument: “[P]revention of future harm might be effected just as
well without a finding of special relationship, as the onus would be placed on companies, not on
their hires, to monitor tasks.” Id. at *16.
169. Id. at *17; see Loube v. Loube, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 911 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[U]nlike
ordinary negligence, professional negligence breaches a duty that exists only because the parties
have a contractual agreement, and it has been recognized that an action for professional negli-
gence constitutes both a tort and a breach of contract.”) (citing Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy,
Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 422–23 (Cal. 1971)).
170. Music Group, 2015 WL 3882448, at *17.
171. Id. (“It may be that there is no particular standard of care for Chief Technology Officers
or IT consultants with respect to cyber security. . . . [But] Plaintiff’s evidence creates a triable
issue as to whether an individual in Defendant’s position owes an independent tort duty based
on the provision of professional services.”).
172. 996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
173. Id. at 954–55.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 955.
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depriving the users of those online services from accessing certain
functions through their PlayStation consoles and devices during that
time.176  Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit alleging negligence in
Sony’s failure to adequately protect plaintiffs’ user information; and
negligent misrepresentation for Sony’s failure to timely disclose that
the reason for the network downtime was a security breach.177  Plain-
tiffs alleged injuries on account of “(1) expenses incurred to purchase
credit monitoring services . . . (2) loss of use and value of Sony Online
Services . . . (3) loss of use and value of Third Party Services . . . and
(4) a diminution in value of Plaintiffs’ Consoles.”178
Sony urged the court to embrace the contractual parties paradigm
and dismiss the claims.  Sony insisted that “Plaintiffs’ California negli-
gence claim is nothing more than an attempt to plead around their
contract with Sony, which clearly disclaims the economic losses Plain-
tiffs now seek to recover.”179  The court rejected Sony’s framing of the
case: “courts will generally enforce the breach of contractual promise
through contract law, except when the actions that constitute the
breach violate a social policy that merits the imposition of tort
remedies.”180
The court thus implicitly adopted the stranger paradigm and
deployed the J’Aire factors as a universal test for duty.  The court rea-
soned that “a plaintiff may be able to pursue both contract and tort
remedies if the plaintiff alleges that the contractual breach also vio-
lated ‘a duty independent of the contract arising from principles of tort
law.’”181  The court held that Sony owed an independent tort duty,
namely the “duty to provide reasonable network security.”182  Ac-
cording to the court, such a duty was “well supported by both com-
mon sense and [state] law.”183  Moreover, the duty to provide network
security “was separate and independent from the PSN User Agree-
176. Id.
177. Id. at 959.
178. In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
179. Id. at 967–68.
180. Id. at 968 (emphasis added) (quoting Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d
669 (Cal. 1995)).  The court did acknowledge that “the economic loss doctrine was created to
prevent ‘the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other.’” Id. (quoting
Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 273 (Cal. 2004)).  Thus, “[a] person may
not ordinarily recover in tort for the breach of duties that merely restate contractual obliga-
tions.” Id. at 967–68 (quoting Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P. 3d 1125, 1135 (Cal 2004)).
181. Id. at 968 (emphasis added) (quoting Aas, 12 P.3d at 1136).
182. Id. at 966.
183. Id.
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ment” and allowed plaintiffs to pursue both tort and contract
remedies.184
Having determined that there was in fact an independent tort duty,
the court nonetheless held that “negligence is the wrong legal theory
on which to pursue recovery for Plaintiffs’ economic losses” on ac-
count of plaintiffs’ “fail[ure] to allege a ‘special relationship’ with
Sony beyond those envisioned in everyday consumer transactions.”185
The court seems either to have confused the paradigms, or else to
have embraced sub rosa the contracting parties paradigm, without ad-
mitting as much.  It makes little sense for a court to embrace the stran-
ger paradigm and determine that there is in fact an independent tort
duty but then bar recovery on account of no “special relationship.”
Moreover, the “independent duty” exception to the economic loss
rule referred to in Sony is too broad and untethered from a close anal-
ysis of the extent to which the contracting framework provides a supe-
rior risk allocation mechanism (as even the Sony court seems to have
concluded).  The Target class action brought on behalf of financial in-
stitutions (as a companion case to the consumer class action consid-
ered above) provides another illustration of this phenomenon.186  The
Minnesota federal district court used the stranger paradigm to analyze
whether Target was negligent with respect to the financial institutions
that had to issue new cards as a result of the data breach.187  The pri-
mary question was whether Target owed the banks a duty of care.188
The court found a duty owed by the retailer to the financial institu-
tions, relying heavily on Minnesota’s Plastic Card Security Act, which
requires businesses to meet certain security standards.189  The court
explained: “While courts are reluctant to recognize duties of care in
the absence of legislative imprimatur, the duty to safeguard credit-
and debit-card data in Minnesota has received that legislative en-
184. In re Sony Gaming Networks, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
185. Id. at 969.
186. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1309 (D. Minn.
2014).
187. The court analyzed the existence of a tort duty under Minnesota law, with no mention of
the economic loss rule. Id.  Defendants did not raise the economic loss rule as a defense.  The
court presumably deployed the stranger paradigm given that Minnesota (by statute) does not
recognize the economic loss rule outside the products liability context.
188. Plaintiffs also asserted claims for negligence per se and a statutory cause of action under
the Plastic Card Security Act, both of which survived the motion to dismiss. Id. at 1312–14.
189. Id. at 1310 (citing MINN. STAT. § 325E.64, subd. 3 (2007)).  The Plastic Card Security Act
forbids any entity conducting business in Minnesota from retaining security data for more than
48 hours after authorization of the transaction. Id. at 1312.  For further discussion of this statute,
see infra note 217. R
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dorsement.”190  The court did not grapple with the contrasting con-
tracting parties paradigm—whereby the existence of a private
network among banks and issuers weighs against the imposition of
tort liability.  To the contrary, the court noted that the voluntary as-
sumption of duties indicated that the burden of liability was not too
great for Target to bear.191
Finally, another recent data breach case, In re Home Depot, Inc.
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,192 provides yet another
vivid illustration of a court’s analysis under the stranger paradigm,
highlighting the capacious duty inquiry and giving short shrift to the
nature of the contractual undertakings amongst the parties.193  As
with other payment card data breach cases, hackers broke into Home
Depot’s retail systems and accessed the personal information of “ap-
proximately 56 million Home Depot customers.”194  Financial institu-
tions that had issued the payment cards used by Home Depot
customers affected by the data breach brought a class  action law-
suit.195  The Georgia federal district court rejected Home Depot’s mo-
tion to dismiss plaintiffs’ negligence claim by giving wide berth to the
“independent duty” exception to the economic loss rule.  In so fram-
ing the case, the court gave little heed to the contracting parties
paradigm.196
The court set the stage: “Here, even though there is a contract be-
tween the card issuers and the Plaintiffs, the independent duty excep-
tion would bar application of the economic loss rule.”197  The court
then articulated a very expansive notion of duty—especially in the
190. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d at 1310 (“[T]he
legislature specifically acknowledged the availability of other causes of action arising out of a
Minnesota company’s failure to safeguard customers’ information, stating that the remedies
under the PCSA ‘are cumulative and do not restrict any other right or remedy otherwise availa-
ble’ to the issuer banks.”).
191. Id.
192. No. 14-md-2583-TWT, 2016 WL 2897520 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2016).
193. Id.
194. Id. at *1.  The court emphasized in great detail that Home Depot was well aware of the
weaknesses in its data retention systems and policies. Id. at *1–2.  Specifically, the court made
note of the numerous times across a five-year period leading up to the data breach that Home
Depot was allegedly notified of its deficiencies by employees, third parties, and federal agencies,
and nonetheless failed to adequately address them. See id. at *1–2.
195. Id. at *2.
196. Id. at *3–4.
197. Id. at *3.  The terms of the contractual relationship are not clear.  The court does not
address whether the parties were in direct privity, or whether this was a similar “web of con-
tracts” scenario as seen in other financial institution data breach claims.  Nor does the financial
institutions’ complaint, which describes the payment card ecosystem in some detail, provide the
answer. See Fin. Inst. Plaintiffs’ Consol. Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 84–88, In re Home Depot,
2015 WL 3814441.
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context of pure financial losses—proclaiming that “Georgia recog-
nizes a general duty ‘to all the world not to subject them to an unrea-
sonable risk of harm.’”198  Given that Home Depot “caused
foreseeable harm to a plaintiff,” the court concluded that it “therefore
owed a duty in tort.”199  Such an “independent duty” thereby
“barr[ed] application of the economic loss rule.”200
It is telling that the court cites the In re Target financial institutions
class action in support of its tort duty holding. In re Target applies
Minnesota law, which refuses to recognize the economic loss rule
outside of the products liability context.  Georgia, however, does rec-
ognize the contractual privity economic loss rule, albeit with an expan-
sive “independent duty” exception.  The court’s analysis shows how
the exception can swallow the rule; indeed, the court’s analysis is
seemingly unaffected by the existence of contractual relationships
among the relevant parties.  In this regard, the Home Depot court’s
tacit embrace of the stranger paradigm draws a marked contrast with
similar cases deploying the contracting parties paradigm.
Consider Silverpop Systems Inc. v. Leading Market Technologies,201
a breach-of-personal-information case that likewise applied Georgia
law but accorded dispositive weight to the nature of the contractual
relationship.  Silverpop and Leading Market entered into a contract
through which Silverpop granted use of an email marketing tool to
Leading Market.202  This tool retained a list of email addresses and
other information that could then be accessed for the purpose of dis-
tributing marketing communications to customers.203  In 2010,
Silverpop’s systems were illicitly accessed by an unauthorized party,
who was able to obtain the stored email information of a number of
Silverpop’s customers, including Leading Market.204
198. In re Home Depot, 2016 WL 2897520, at *3 (quoting Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296
S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. 1982)).
199. Id. (“Defendant knew about a substantial data security risk dating back to 2008 but failed
to implement reasonable security measures to combat it.”).
200. Id.
201. 641 F. App’x 849 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam), aff’g in relevant part, No. 12-cv-2513-SCJ,
2014 WL 11164763 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2014).
202. Id. at 850.
203. Id.
204. Id.  Though Leading Market was informed of the breach, it continued to use Silverpop’s
services without making payment.  After Silverpop suspended Leading Market’s access to its
services, Leading Market asserted that it was “operating under an understanding with Silverpop
that the question of payment would be resolved after the parties came to an agreement on
whether to renew the contract when it came ripe for renewal.” Id.  Silverpop then initiated an
action in the Northern District of Georgia, seeking a declaratory judgment that Leading Market
was not injured by the data breach, and thus Silverpop was not liable to Leading Market on,
among other claims, a negligence theory. Id. at 850–51.
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In deciding whether Leading Market’s negligence claim was barred
by the economic loss rule, the Silverpop court (like the Home Depot
court) applied the Georgia contractual economic loss rule with the
independent duty exception, but in Silverpop, the court’s framing of
the rule is remarkably different.  The court began by reciting that
Georgia’s economic loss rule allows for recovery of damages to “prop-
erty that is not the subject of [a] contract . . . on the premise that ‘the
duty breached in such situations generally arises independent of the
contract.’”205  The court concluded, however, that any duty to protect
the email list at issue arose under the terms of the contract between
the parties, which had included provisions within their contract gov-
erning the protection of confidential information.206
Silverpop and Home Depot thus exemplify divergent approaches to
the application of the “independent duty” exception to the economic
loss rule to data breach cases.  In Silverpop, the existence of a well-
defined contractual relationship between the parties led the court to
channel the claims towards the terms of their contract.207  In contrast,
the Home Depot court found a “stranger” paradigm-type “general
duty” owed to all to avoid inflicting harm on others.208
C. Contracting Parties Paradigm Reassessed
Given this evidence that courts have been misapplying the stranger
paradigm in data breach cases, it is worth considering both why and
what alternative is available to them.  Here, the answer is related—
courts are rejecting the contracting parties paradigm, at least as tradi-
205. Id. at 853 (quoting Bates & Assocs. v. Romei, 426 S.E.2d 919, 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)).
206. Id.  The court also rejected Leading Market’s alternative arguments, that Georgia’s “acci-
dent” and “misrepresentation” exceptions permit a negligence claim. Id. at 853–54.  Under the
accident exception, Georgia permits recovery of economic losses “for damages to [a] defective
product itself, where the injury resulted from an accident.” Id. at 854 (quoting Flintkote Co. v.
Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942, 948 (11th Cir. 1982)).  However, in order to justify application of the
exception, the accident must constitute “a calamity, sudden violence, collision with another ob-
ject, or some catastrophic event.” Id. (quoting Busbee v. Chrysler Corp., 524 S.E.2d 539, 542
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999)).  Noting that the parties entered into an agreement for a service, not a
product, the court found that there was “no basis” for applying the “accident” exception to the
negligence claim at issue. Id.
The court similarly found no basis to recognize a “misrepresentation” exception in the case.
Id.  Though Georgia recognizes such an exception, the court concluded that Leading Market
failed to plead any claim of fraud or misrepresentation, either as separate counts or as part of its
negligence pleading, to serve as a sufficient basis to apply the exception. Id.  Instead, Leading
Market’s “sole . . . basis for the negligence claim is Silverpop’s failure to protect against the data
breach.” Id.
207. Silverpop, 641 F. App’x at 853.
208. In re Home Depot, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-md-2583-TWT, 2016
WL 2897520, at *3–4 (N.D. Ga. May 18, 2016).
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tionally understood.  This Section argues that the courts in Lone Star,
Music Group, Sony, Target, and Home Depot should have analyzed
the respective cases before them via the lens of the contracting parties
paradigm, which would have affected the starting point—not necessa-
rily the ending point—of each decision.  This Article does not advo-
cate for rigid application of the contractual privity economic loss rule
consistent with a resolute preference for private ordering.  Instead, af-
ter embracing the contracting parties paradigm as the starting point,
courts should consider whether there are, nonetheless, powerful justi-
fications for the imposition of tort liability.
1. The Contractual Liability Default
The contracting parties paradigm is a defensible starting point for
courts’ analyses.  As a general matter, contracting parties internalize
the costs and benefits of risks and outcomes within their transactions.
As succinctly stated by the Annett court, it is often the case that par-
ties who “contracted to assume certain risks of financial loss [also] had
the ability to minimize these risks.”209  In other words, contracting
parties can allocate risks and responsibilities amongst themselves effi-
ciently so as to place responsibilities on the “cheapest cost avoiders.”
Courts have an interest in encouraging such private ordering
amongst contracting parties.  In the data breach context, sophisticated
parties, such as financial institutions and mega-retailers, are best
equipped to identify and guard against such data breach risks—includ-
ing via negotiation with the web of contracting parties—and it thus
flouts reality to treat these actors as “strangers” to one another, even
if they are not in direct privity of contract.
Courts’ embrace of the contracting parties paradigm, as applied to
the web of contracting parties in the data breach scenarios, would also
encourage parties to devise and extend systems of industry regulation
along the lines of the PCI-DSS standards, which were heavily relied
on in Heartland.  Five international payment card brands—American
Express, Visa, MasterCard, Discover, and JCB—worked together to
release the PCI-DSS in December, 2004.210  Prior to the creation of
PCI-DSS, each card brand followed its own standards in contractual
relationships with entities within its network.  The creation of such
industry standards is likely to outperform regulation by tort liability,
209. Annett Holdings v. Kum & Go, L.C., 801 N.W.2d 499, 505 (Iowa 2011); see supra note
121 and accompanying text. R
210. See Edward A. Morse & Vasant Raval, Private Ordering in Light of the Law: Achieving
Consumer Protection Through Payment Card Security Measures, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
213, 229 (2012).
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at least in terms of its ability to harness information and expertise by
the industry actors.  Individuals (especially consumers, but even finan-
cial institutions outside of the industry network) would then be able to
argue that the actors fell short of these industry standards.  Finally, it
is likely that the emergence and development of a robust cyber risk
insurance market would alter these networks of relationships and
nudge parties to form stronger contractual ties.211
2. The Case for Tort Liability
The courts might still conclude that tort liability is warranted, but
only once the plaintiff has made the case that, notwithstanding the
voluntary allocation of risks and responsibilities between the con-
tracting parties (or the potential for such allocation amongst a web of
contracting parties) tort liability should be imposed by law.  The
strongest argument for imposition of such tort liability is the existence
of externalized risks onto third parties, who are in essence strangers to
the contracting parties paradigm.  Tort is thus a stand-in for public
regulation of the contracting parties.
Courts, in other words, should start with the contracting parties par-
adigm and then proceed to explore its limitations, if any, in the partic-
ular case.  In Sony, for example, the court could have considered
whether the application of a contractual privity economic loss rule
would have left unremedied specific harms to third parties or more
general societal externalities.  Indeed, the court seems to have sug-
gested as much when it referred to “actions that . . . violate a social
policy” warranting a tort remedy.212  The point here is not that the
court’s choice of paradigm would in fact be outcome determinative;
the goal is for courts to apply a consistent and coherent framework
that does not neglect the role for private ordering via contract.
211. Cybersecurity insurance is not yet widely adopted. See, e.g., 2012 WORKING GROUP,
supra note 11, at 13 (estimating 25% of companies have cybersecurity insurance policies); R
PONEMON INST., MANAGING CYBER SECURITY AS A BUSINESS RISK: CYBER INSURANCE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 4 (2013), http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/Cyber%20Insurance%20
white%20paper%20FINAL%207.pdf (estimating that 31% of companies have existing policies,
whereas 57% claim they plan to purchase cybersecurity insurance in the future).
A recent RAND study—the first of its kind to collect and analyze over one hundred cyber
insurance policies—noted that “PCI as an industry standard for payment processing was promi-
nent in many questionnaires [issued by insurance carriers to assess security risks of applicants].”
Sasha Romanosky et al., Content Analysis of Cyber Insurance Policies: How Do Carriers De-
velop Policies and Price Cyber Risk? 20 (Mar. 7, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
DePaul Law Review).
212. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942,
968 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (emphasis added).
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Consider, in this vein, how the court in Home Depot implicitly con-
cluded that imposing tort liability on the retailer placed liability on the
cheapest cost avoider.  The court reasoned that failing to place the
burden of more stringent data security practices on Home Depot
would allow virtually all companies that deal in sensitive information
to avoid liability for their relaxed data security practices.213  Thus, to
justify the policy implications of its decision to find an expansive “le-
gal duty to safeguard information” (notwithstanding any contractual
undertakings between the parties), the court stated:
To hold that no such duty existed would allow retailers to use out-
dated security measures and turn a blind eye to the ever-increasing
risk of cyber attacks, leaving consumers with no recourse to recover
damages even though the retailer was in a superior position to safe-
guard the public from such a risk.214
But how does the court know that the retailer is in the “superior
position to safeguard the public”?  The court’s approach—starting
with the stranger paradigm and then invoking a very expansive notion
of duty, separate and apart from any contractual undertakings—
leaves much to be desired.  The better approach would be for the
court to begin with a close examination of the allocation of risks and
responsibilities among the parties operating within the credit card
processing ecosystem.
Starting from the contracting parties paradigm would call for a
more precise argument to be made by the plaintiff, and would un-
doubtedly raise the threshold for tort recovery.  With a contractual
liability default rule, the court would nonetheless entertain arguments
that there are significant externalities not internalized within web of
contracting parties.  It is an empirical matter—based upon fine-
grained analysis of industry conditions—whether third-party credit
payment scenarios fit this description.215  This judgment would not
necessarily have to be made on a case-by-case basis in private litiga-
tion.  The Washington State Legislature, for example, adopted a stat-
ute that governs negligence liability of credit card processors and
vendors, making them liable to financial institutions for purely eco-
213. In re Home Depot, 2016 WL 2897520, at *3–4.
214. Id. at *4.
215. For a compelling argument that the consumer credit card network entails significant net-
work externalities that justify the imposition of tort liability, see David W. Opderbeck, Cyber-
security, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD.
L. REV. 935, 939, 983 (2016).  Opderbeck relies upon a growing economic literature. See, e.g.,
Sujit Chakravorti, Externalities in Payment Card Networks: Theory and Evidence 1, 4–6, 31–32
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Pol’y Discussion Paper No. 2009-8, 2009); Hal Varian, System Relia-
bility and Free Riding, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 1, 8–9 (L. Jean Camp & Ste-
phen Lewis eds., 2004).
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nomic losses if they fail to “take reasonable care to guard against un-
authorized access to account information.”216
Moreover, the “professionals” exception to the contractual privity
rule can also fit this conceptual framework.  Recall how the court in
Music Group implicitly suggested the need to consider the “profes-
sionalization” of the IT services industry as a means to protect the
wider public.  Though the court was restrained from going as far as
holding to that effect, it did seem open to the possibility that the same
underlying rationale for recognizing extra-contractual duties for cer-
tain professionals (e.g., accountants, lawyers, architects, and environ-
mental services professionals) may be applicable to IT professionals.
The recognition of such a policy may go a long way towards opening
up avenues for relief in data breach cases where plaintiffs would oth-
erwise be barred by the economic loss rule.  But, instead of operating
as a blanket, categorical exclusion—with all of the attendant uncer-
tainty regarding who qualifies as a “professional”—here, too, the bur-
den should be on the plaintiff to demonstrate how, in the case of a
contract with a particular professional, there are externalized third-
party costs.  Here, tort liability functions literally as regulation of con-
tracting parties and should be justified, if at all, by consideration of
the need for such regulation, especially in light of other public regula-
tion of certain professionals.
V. CONCLUSION: THE REGULATORY CHALLENGE
OF DATA BREACHES
The main goal of this Article is to frame the relevant questions
courts should ask when faced with data security breach cases raising
tort claims.  It is appropriate for courts to begin—but not end—with
the contracting parties paradigm, taking into account the mechanisms
216. WASH. STAT. ANN. § 19.255.020(3)(a) (West 2016).  The provision reads:
If a processor or business fails to take reasonable care to guard against unauthorized
access to account information that is in the possession or under the control of the busi-
ness or processor, and the failure is found to be the proximate cause of a breach, the
processor or business is liable to a financial institution for reimbursement of reasonable
actual costs related to the reissuance of credit cards and debit cards that are incurred by
the financial institution to mitigate potential current or future damages to its credit card
and debit card holders that reside in the state of Washington as a consequence of the
breach, even if the financial institution has not suffered a physical injury in connection
with the breach.
Id.  The statute also uses the PCI-DSS to provide “a ‘safe harbor’ by which entities would not be
liable if they were ‘certified compliant with the payment card industry data security standards
adopted by the payment card industry security standards council, and in force at the time of the
breach.’”  Christopher Bosch, Note, Securing the Smart Grid: Protecting National Security and
Privacy Through Mandatory, Enforceable Interoperability Standards, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1349, 1405 n.305 (2014).
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by which the parties voluntarily allocated risks and responsibilities be-
tween them (or could have taken advantage of existing institutional
arrangements to do so).  Courts should then consider whether, not-
withstanding contractual (or quasi-contractual) relationships, there
are significant externalities imposed on third parties.  Drawing this al-
together, courts should be in search of the cheapest cost avoider for
imposition of liability; within this model, the existence of contract as
the preferred method of allocation of risk and responsibility should be
a significant factor, but one that could be outweighed in institutional
contexts whereby such arrangements externalize significant risk onto
hapless third parties.
Traces of such an analysis are buried within several of the data
breach cases discussed so far.  It does seem as if courts are motivated
to address the negative externalities borne especially by consumers
(but also including sophisticated players such as financial institutions)
by imposing tort liability on merchants and other breached entities
that the courts assume have the ability to minimize risks by adopting
greater security measures.  However, the courts are doing so not only
in an ad hoc manner, but also by stretching and misapplying the stran-
ger paradigm for the economic loss rule.
This Article advocates a broader regulatory perspective on the eco-
nomic loss rule.  To return full circle to where we began in the intro-
duction, data breaches pose a regulatory challenge to which the
federal and state governments, federal agencies, private industry, and
private litigation have responded.  We must therefore ask what is the
optimal regulatory approach to address third-party externalities im-
posed by contracting parties?  Consider the Washington Statute re-
ferenced above.217  There, the legislature made a judgment to
allow financial institutions to recover against credit card processors
and vendors, regardless of contractual undertakings among the
217. Two additional state statutes incorporate PCI-DSS into data security statutes.  Minnesota
was “the first state to adopt legislation that effectively protects issuing banks from costs incurred
to protect cardholders.”  Morse & Raval, supra note 210, at 246.  The statute adopts some, but R
not all, of the requirements from the PCI-DSS. See James T. Graves, Note, Minnesota’s PCI
Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1115, 1132 (2008) (discussing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.64 (West 2007)).  The Minnesota
law establishes standards prohibiting the storage of personal data, and creates a cause of action
for financial institutions to recover from entities that fail to meet the statute’s requirements. Id.
However, the law “only adopts a small subset of [PCI-DSS’s] requirements.” Id. at 1135.  It is
more permissive than the privately created standard, but does take steps to allow financial insti-
tutions to shift costs in the event of a breach. Id.
Nevada’s law requires any data collector doing business in the state to comply with the current
version of the PCI-DSS. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.215 (2015).  The statute does not
expressly provide a cause of action or impose a penalty for noncompliance.
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parties.218  Cyberinsurance, moreover, can operate as a form of regu-
lation by providing risk management services.219  There is emerging
evidence that suggests many firms rate themselves as under-prepared
for a data breach and that insurance companies are working with firms
to provide some (albeit at this point limited) support aimed at
preventing breaches (as opposed to acting primarily to mitigate losses
in the aftermath of a breach).220
To sum up, at present, tort liability (imposed as either exceptions to
or end runs around the economic loss rule) would lead to a more ro-
bust cyberinsurance market, which predictably leads to further regula-
tion—especially if there are third-party externalities.  At that time, the
economic loss rule can then forestall further tort liability.  Seen in this
broader regulatory perspective, the economic loss rule serves to police
the boundary not only between tort and contract, but, even more so,
between tort and regulation as alternative mechanisms to regulate
contractual parties.
218. Such a policy judgment might be misguided.  Richard Epstein and Thomas Brown have
criticized Minnesota’s statutory provision, on the ground that it does not account for “all of the
other provisions of the elaborate contracts that currently bind participants in the payment card
networks.  In particular, the statute completely fails to recognize the fact that the shift in the
liability rules may increase the costs of payment card acceptance to merchants to the point that
they either drop out of the systems entirely or demand some reduction in the fees that they pay.”
Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 203, 222 (2008).  My only point here is that such a policy judgment could be appropriate
if based upon findings of third-party externalities, which would justify further regulation of the
contractual parties.
219. 2012 WORKING GROUP, supra note 11, at 1 (describing cybersecurity insurance as an R
“‘effective, market-driven way of increasing cybersecurity’ because it may help reduce the num-
ber of successful cyber attacks by promoting widespread adoption of preventative measures”).
More specifically, by offering lower premiums to firms that adopt specific safeguards, insurance
can incentivize good cybersecurity practices. Id. at 5; see also Sales, supra note 8, at 1536 (dis- R
cussing how insurance companies can provide “second-order regulation, enforcing cyber-security
standards by refusing to bear the losses of firms with poor records or engaging in price discrimi-
nation against them”).
220. See 2014 WORKING GROUP, supra note 11, at 3 (suggesting that increasing dialogue be- R
tween insurance carriers and potential insureds will “harness the incentivizing effect of private
insurance contracts to promote more informed and effective cybersecurity practice”).  A recent
high profile example is the partnership between Microsoft, which developed “Secure Score” to
rate the security settings of commercial customers that use Office 365, and Hartford Financial
Services Group Inc., the first company to announce publicly that it will use Microsoft’s Secure
Score as a factor in determining premiums for cyberinsurance. See Jay Greene, Microsoft to Rate
Corporate Cybersecurity: Hartford Financial Says It Will Use the Office 365 Secure Score When
Setting Cyberinsurance Rates, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/micro
soft-to-rate-corporate-cybersecurity-1486749600 (“It gives us insight and comfort that you are
doing some risk management.” (quoting Tom Kang, Hartford’s head of cyberinsurance)).  The
recent RAND study provides further evidence that insurance companies are moving in this di-
rection by furnishing detailed security questionnaires to applicants, asking a range of questions
relating to “IT, management and policy/compliance practices adopted by the applicant.”  Roma-
nosky et al., supra note 211, at 15. R
